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A B S T R A C T. In a fiercely competitive labor market, large American law firms universally offer
some paid leave to attorneys after the birth of the child. This Note offers an empirical
investigation of those policies, finding that all firms offer paid leave to new mothers, and many
firms offer at least some leave to fathers as well. In most cases, however, men receive much less
leave than women. The most grossly gender-disproportionate policies harm attorneys of both
genders - perpetuating stereotypes about women, stigmatizing fathers who spend time with
their children, and entrenching the "ideal worker" norm that scholars have protested. Based on
this analysis, the Note illustrates how some policies are vulnerable to a Title VII challenge by
male employees. In particular, law firms that offer maternity leave of three to four months,
without offering male attorneys a parallel benefit, violate Title VII's prohibition on sex
discrimination. Furthermore, some firms offering facially neutral policies may also manifest
impermissible gender bias in the application of parental leave.
A U T H O R. Yale Law School, J.D. 2009; Stanford University, B.S. 2004. Special thanks to
Professors Robert Gordon, William Eskridge, and Keith Cunningham-Parmeter for their insight
and advice. Thanks also to Jennifer Broxmeyer, Jon Donenberg, Jill Habig, Anne O'Hagen Karl,
Hawley Linke, Joseph Minta, Erin Phillips, Ellen K. Weis, Katherine Wilson-Milne, and
Anthony Young for their sustained, patient, and excellent assistance.
NOTE CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION 1184
I. LEAVE POLICIES AT U.S. LAW FIRMS 1185
A. Methodology 1187
B. Availability of Leave for Men and Women 1189
C. Types of Leave 1190
D. Patterns in the Provision of Leave 1193
E. Law Firm Prestige and Leave Available 1195
II. LEAVE POLICIES AND GENDER DISCRIMINATION 1197
A. Gender Discrimination in Law Firms 1197
B. Leave Policies and Assumptions About Women 1204
C. Leave Policies and Assumptions About Family Dynamics 12o6
Ill. TITLE VII CHALLENGES TO LEAVE POLICIES 1210
A. Development of Federal Law 1211
B. Challenging Extended Disability-Leave 1216
C. As-Applied Challenges to Primary Caregiver Leave 1221
D. Explaining the Persistence ofVulnerable Policies 1224
CONCLUSION 1228
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
INTRODUCTION
America's most prestigious law firms fiercely compete for talented lawyers
and law school graduates, enticing them with lavish recruiting trips, expensive
gourmet meals, and glossy informational brochures. Some estimate that
recruiting and training a new associate to replace a second- or third-year
associate can cost as much as $500,000.' Given this spare-no-expense attitude
toward recruitment, it is no surprise that firms have become concerned as the
popular media and legal press have focused the spotlight on "family friendly"
workplaces in the legal profession. As a result, many law firms have positioned
themselves to highlight the benefits they provide to attorneys with family
commitments.'
Maternity and parental leave programs, which offer attorneys paid time off
after the birth of a child, are a centerpiece of law firm rhetoric regarding
lawyers with families. For example, one firm explains that it is devoted to
"address[ing] the work-family needs" of its attorneys by providing the
"greatest possible amount of support in the critical months following the
arrival of a new child."4 Indeed, America's largest law firms universally offer
some paid leave to new mothers, and a majority also offer some form of paid
leave to attorney fathers.' Nevertheless, the policies differ greatly in both
program structure and overall generosity. Of particular interest is the
remarkable variety in the paid leave that law firms provide to fathers.
This Note provides an empirical investigation of paid maternity and
paternity leave policies at America's one hundred "most prestigious "6 law
1. E.g., Danielle M. Evans, Note, Non-Equity Partnership: A Flawed Solution to the
Disproportionate Advancement of Women in Private Law Firms, 28 WOMEN's RTs. L. REP. 93,
98 (2007)-
2. See, e.g., Suzanne Riss, Teresa Palagano & Angela Ebron, 2007 Best Law Firms for Women,
WORKING MOTHER, http://www.workingmother.conV?service=vpage/797 (last visited Feb.
6, 2009); see also Yale Law Women, 2oo8 Top Ten Family Firms,
http://www.law.yale.edu/stuorgs/topten.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2009).
3. See Keith Cunningham, Note, Father Time: Flexible Work Arrangements and the Law Firm's
Failure of the Family, 53 STAN L. REv. 967, 971 (2001) ("Firms are speaking about the [work-
life] dilemma because the best and brightest associates come in with the attitude that they
have a life, a profession and a family ..." (quoting psychologist Everett Moitoza)).
4. Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, Work-Life Balance, http://www.stblaw.com/
sitecontent.cfm?contentlD=24&itemlD=266 (last visited Feb. 6, 2009).
5. See infra Section I.B.
6. VAULT GUIDE TO THE ToP OO LAW FIRMs (Brian Dalton ed., 2008) [hereinafter VAULT
GUIDE]. Vault measures "prestige" by asking attorneys at previously ranked firms to provide
their assessment of all firms under consideration for ranking. No other metrics are used.
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firms. Part I describes the methodology and results of the investigation,
highlighting important patterns in law firm provision of parental leave. The
data collected here reveals that some firms provide generous leave to men and
women, but other firms provide mothers with extremely extended maternity
leave-well in excess of their pregnancy-related disability -while offering
fathers little or no paid time off when their children are born. These grossly
disproportionate leave policies fail to distinguish between childbearing and
childrearing in problematic ways.
Part II discusses how disproportionate leave policies create hurdles for male
and female attorneys. Women are stigmatized by inferences about their
abilities and their commitment to their careers, while men are burdened by
assumptions about fatherhood that prevent them from engaging fully in their
children's lives. This account of family responsibility discrimination is rooted
in feminist theory's conception of the "ideal worker" norm,7 which intersects
with parental leave policies in important ways.
Part III furthers this inquiry by illustrating how some of these law firm
policies are so inconsistent with federal legal requirements as to be seriously
vulnerable to a Title VII challenge. Employers violate Title VII's prohibition on
sex discrimination when they fail to distinguish between leave available to
women as a result of pregnancy-related disability and leave available to parents
to bond with a new baby. As discussed below, this is true even in light of
Supreme Court precedent that allows employers to treat pregnancy disability
more favorably than other conditions.
I. LEAVE POLICIES AT U.S. LAW FIRMS
Although attorneys may choose from a wide variety of practice settings,
large firms represent the most visible and highest paying employers in the
profession and warrant investigation. Researching parental leave policies at
America's largest firms offers an opportunity to understand how an influential
group of employers provides family leave benefits.
7. See, e.g., JOAN C. WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND
WHAT To Do ABOUT IT 70 (2000) [hereinafter WILLIAMS, UNBENDING]; Joan C. Williams &
Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for Family Caregivers Who Are Discriminated
Against on the Job, 26 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 77, 8o (2003) [hereinafter Williams & Segal,
Relief].
S. AM. BAR Ass'N, LAWYER DEMOGRAPHICS (2006), http://www.abanet.org/marketresearch/
lawyerdemographics _oo6.pdf (indicating that 74% of attorneys surveyed in 200o are in
private practice, and 14% of those are in firms with lol or more attorneys).
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Law firms are also an excellent target for empirical study. New attorney
recruitment occurs on a fixed track and is regulated by a powerful trade
association. 9 Large firms offer relatively comparable work,'" and draw
employees from a single, competitive labor pool. The analysis here is
particularly important because it focuses on benefits provided to high-status
employees in a market where employers are competing on that basis. In the
workplace as a whole, lower-paid employees generally are offered leave benefits
consistent with the minimum requirements of federal law or collective
bargaining agreements." In many contexts, higher-paid employees are
excluded expressly from official parental leave policies, and generous benefits
are not part of the employment culture.'2 Law firms, by contrast, are facing a
crisis in "work/life satisfaction" and are experimenting with creative ways to
accommodate women attorneys. 3 If, even in this context, employers persist in
offering discriminatory leave policies, then one can infer profound disparities
in the workforce as a whole.
Moreover, large law firms have a unique and tumultuous history of
rejecting, then cautiously welcoming, and now struggling to accommodate
women and parents. Forty years ago, large firms were largely off-limits to
female lawyers; it was not until law students threatened suit in 1969 that they
began hiring an appreciable number of women.' 4 Today, women make up 49%
of new associates.'" Yet women still face challenges.' 6 They constitute only 16%
9. See National Association for Law Placement, Mission, http://www.nalp.org/mission (last
visited Feb. 6, 2009).
lo. See Bruce E. Aronson, Elite Law Firm Mergers and Reputational Competition: Is Bigger Really
Better?, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 763, 763 (2007) (discussing "presumed client demand for
'one-stop shopping' [in law firms]").
ii. See Ann O'Leary, How Family Leave Laws Left Out Low-Income Workers, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP.
& LAB. L. 1, 11 (2007) (explaining the ways in which the development of federal law has left
low-income women with limited benefits).
12. Cf. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2601-2654 (2000) (excluding high
paid employees).
13. Deborah Epstein Henry, Facing the FACTS: Work/Life Choices for All Firm Lawyers Within
the Billable Hour Model, DIVERSITY & BAR, Nov./Dec. 2007, at 17.
14. See KAREN BERGER MORELLO, THE INVISIBLE BAR: THE WOMAN LAWYER IN AMERICA 1638 TO
THE PRESENT 210-13 (1986); Amy E. Decker, Women in Corporate Law: Rewriting the Rules, 4
AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 511,514-16 (1996).
15. See NAT'L ASS'N WOMEN LAWYERS, NATIONAL SURVEY ON RETENTION AND PROMOTION OF
WOMEN IN LAW FIRMS 4 (2007), http://www.abanet.org/nawl/docs/
FINAL_survey-reportjll-14-07.pdf [hereinafter NAWL SuRVEY].
16. See generally Decker, supra note 14, at 515-16; Alison A. Reuter, Subtle but Pervasive:
Discrimination Against Mothers and Pregnant Women in the Workplace, 33 FORDHAM URI3. L.J.
1369,1405-16 (2006).
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of the equity partners at large law firms 7 and endure discrimination from
colleagues, clients, and supervisors. 8 In addition, competitive pressures are
forcing firms to reevaluate their attorneys' work-life balance, and are
rethinking their conception of parenthood for attorneys of both genders.' 9
Understanding how law firms offer maternity and paternity leave can offer
insight into the changing role of women and parents in America.
Before turning to the empirical investigation of law firms, it is useful to
provide a brief overview of parental leave policies in the workforce as a whole.
Federal law requires most employers to provide most employees with twelve
weeks of unpaid leave.2" A 2005 study revealed that employers provided an
average of 16.7 weeks of (possibly unpaid) job-guaranteed leave to women, and
14.5 weeks of leave to men." With respect to paid leave policies, which are the
subject of this Note, 54% of employers offer at least some paid leave to women,
while 12% offer paid leave to men. No data is available on the average amount
of paid leave available, but evidence suggests that it is reasonably common to
offer women paid leave during a six-week period of pregnancy-related
disability, and substantially less common to offer other kinds of paid leave. 3 As
described below, law firm policies differ from this general structure in several
important ways.
A. Methodology
This analysis examines parental leave policies at one hundred firms-
namely, the firms listed in the 2008 edition of the Vault Guide to the Top loo
Law Firms. 4 For each firm, the following information was collected: total
17. See NAWL SURVEY, supra note I5, at 4.
iB. See Decker, supra note 14, at 517-25; see also HOLLY ENGLISH, GENDER ON TRIAL: SEXUAL
STEREOTYPES AND WORK/LIFE BALANCE IN THE LEGAL WORKFORCE 5-8 (2003).
ig. A number of nonprofit organizations have made attorneys' work-life balance their sole
mission. See, e.g., Center for WorkLife Law, http://www.uchasings.edu/centers/worklife-
law.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2009); Project for Attorney Retention, http://www.pardc.org/
(last visited Feb. 6, 2009).
2o. See 29 U.S.C. § 2601-2654 (wo0o).
21. JAMES T. BOND ET AL., FAMILIES & WORK INST., 2005 NATIONAL STUDY OF EMPLOYERS 11
tbl.6 (2005), http://www.familiesandwork.org/eproducts/200snse.pdf.
22. See id. at 13 tbl.8.
23. Id.
24. VAULT GUIDE, supra note 6. For access to free online content regarding Vault Rankings, see
Vault, Law Firm Rankings, available at http://www.vault.coni/nr/
lawrankings.jsplaw20o8=2&topIoO=l&chId=242 (last visited Feb. 6, 2009).
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weeks of leave available to women, total weeks of leave available to men, leave
provided as disability leave, leave provided as "parental" leave, leave provided
to "primary caregivers," and leave provided as a nondisability maternity leave
or paternity leave. This Note considers only paid parental leave policies; the
analysis does not look at unpaid leave or leave available for other kinds of
family commitments, such as caring for an aging parent or sick spouse.
The Notes relies on information drawn from two sources: law firms' own
websites describing attorney benefits, and the "workplace questionnaire" data
collected by the National Association of Legal Professionals (NALP) and made
available on its website in January 2008.2 The relevant questions from the
NALP workplace questionnaire are not detailed (for example, "How many
weeks of paid parental leave do [fiemale attorneys receive?,,26), but in all cases
the firms provided enough description in the questionnaire to explain
sufficiently how their leave policies work. Information was not available from
any source for fourteen of the one hundred firms surveyed; results for the
remaining eighty-six firms are presented below.
Important limitations to this approach deserve some discussion. To begin,
this analysis looks only at firms' leave policies, not at actual attorney usage of
available parental leave. A number of researchers are investigating the extent to
which male and female attorneys actually take time off,2 7 and many observers
have called attention to the fact that fathers often do not take leave even when
it is available to them. 8 Nonetheless, the policies themselves are still
important, both because they are prerequisite for attorney usage of leave, and
because they perform a valuable signaling function to new parents. Another
important limitation is the constantly changing nature of law firm leave
policies. Recent research, for example, indicates that a number of law firms'
policies have changed since they last updated their NALP records, and other
firms show inconsistencies between the paper and online versions of the NALP
survey, which were completed at different times. 9 The data is also limited by
25. See National Association of Legal Professionals, Directory of Legal Employers,
http://www.nalpdirectory.com (last visited Feb. 6, 2009) [hereinafter NALP Directory]. To
access workplace questionnaire data, follow the link to "Advanced Search," search for a firm
by name, and click on the "Workplace Questionanaire" icon.
26. Id.
27. See Center for WorkLife Law, http://www.uchastings.edu/centers/worklife-law.html (last
visited Feb. 6, 2009); Project for Attorney Retention, http://www.pardc.org/ (last visited
Feb. 6, 2009).
28. See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 3, at 993-94; infra notes 75-82 and accompanying text.
29. See, e.g., Above the Law, Featured Survey Results: Maternity Leave,
http://www.abovethelaw.com/2oo8/o2/featured-survey resultsmatern_.php (last visited
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its relatively narrow scope, as it considers only one hundred prestigious firms.
While these firms are not a representative random sample of legal practice,
they do represent industry leaders and employ a significant percentage of law
school graduates.3" Moreover, the intense competition among these employers
is important, as it underlies the assumption that employers are adopting these
policies out of need to entice and retain employees. Thus, the data described
here paints an interesting, if incomplete, picture of leave policies.
General descriptive statistics are presented in Section I.B. Sections I.C and
I.D classify firm leave policies into several categories based on the types of leave
they provide, the differences in treatment of men and women, and the overall
generosity of the parental leave program. The relationship between firm
ranking and available leave is examined in Section I.E. This analysis reveals
that firms often fail to distinguish between childbearing and childrearing in the
design of their parental leave policies, offering women benefits that far exceed
their pregnancy-related disability without providing a comparable benefit to
men.
B. Availability of Leave for Men and Women
Of the firms for which information was available, all provide paid
maternity leave to female attorneys, ranging from four to eighteen weeks and
averaging 11.9 weeks. The standard deviation" is 2.82 weeks, and the median
and mode are both 12 weeks. Eighty-seven percent of the firms analyzed also
offer paid leave to male attorneys, ranging from one to twelve weeks. The
average leave available to men is 3.9 weeks, 32 with a standard deviation of 3.18
weeks, and the median and mode both equal four weeks.
Feb. 6, 2009); Above the Law, Featured Survey Results: Paternity Leave,
http://www.abovethelaw.coM/2oo8/o3/featured-survey-results-patern.php (last visited
Feb. 6, 2009).
30. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
31. It bears emphasizing that the data represents a complete population-Vault's "most
prestigious" firms- not a sample, so standard deviation is the appropriate metric.
32. This average includes firms that do not have paid paternity leave; that is, they offer zero
weeks of leave.
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Table i.
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS. ALL VALUES INDICATE WEEKS OF LEAVE.
WOE E
Range 4 to 18 0 to 12
n 11.9 3-9
St. Dev. 2.82 3.18
1 Median 12 4
Mode 12 4
These descriptive statistics reveal two striking facts. First, for both men and
women, the distribution seems remarkably symmetrical: the mean, median,
and mode are nearly identical. This indicates that while it might be typical for
firms to provide twelve weeks of leave to women and four weeks of leave to
men (indeed, a plurality of firms offer precisely this policy), these values
operate as neither a floor nor a ceiling on the amount of leave employers choose
to offer. In fact, 21% of firms offer women more than twelve weeks of leave,
while 20% offer less. 33
The second observation focuses on the standard deviations of the two
distributions. For men, the standard deviation is large in proportion to the
mean, indicating that the distribution is not only symmetrical, but also fairly
flat. That is, there is substantial variation in the amount of leave available to
men at large law firms. Leave available to women, on the other hand, is much
more tightly clustered around the twelve-week mean. This suggests that law
firms may be more aware of each others' maternity leave policies, and
competitive pressures are more influential in driving women's leave policies
toward a twelve-week standard.
C. Types of Leave
Although numerical analysis provides an interesting summary of family
leave, a much sharper image emerges from a more qualitative analysis. The
33. For men, 22% of firms offer more than four weeks, and 35% offer fewer. Interestingly, when
firms deviate from the "twelve-and-four" standard, they tend to alter the available leave in
the same direction-only 6% of firms offer women more than twelve weeks while offering
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above discussion focused on the total leave available to female and male
attorneys -broadly termed maternity leave and paternity leave. In fact, leave
policies generally are not structured in this way. Instead, firms offer
complicated policies with different kinds of leave-some available only to one
gender, some available to all new parents. In general, firms rely on three types
of leave: disability leave for women, parental leave for all attorneys, and
nondisability leave, which is offered differently depending on the attorney's
gender.
Disability leave offers women paid time off to recover from the physical
disability associated with childbirth. Some firms compensate women for the
actual "period of pregnancy disability," defining the length of the pregnancy
disability leave in the same way that disability leave for heart attacks or skiing
accidents are defined- the actual period during which the attorney is unable to
work.34 For normal pregnancy and childbirth, postpartum disability lasts
approximately six weeks, though some women in certain occupations can
return to work much sooner, and some complicated pregnancies or deliveries
create much longer periods of disability.3" Most firms, however, do not base
disability leave on the circumstances of the individual woman's pregnancy.
Instead, they offer a "fixed" disability period. Fixed disability leave ranges from
four to sixteen weeks, and a female attorney who gives birth automatically
receives the entire fixed-leave period, regardless of her level of actual
disability. 36 Disability leave, therefore, can be either actual or fixed, and fixed
leave is either normal (four to eight weeks) or extended (ten to sixteen weeks).
Many firms also rely on parental leave periods. As one firm explains, these
periods "relate to the time necessary to adjust to the demands of a new child in
the home and, therefore, are offered to both male and female associates in the
[flirm." 37 Despite the implication of parental parity, parental leave is not
always available on an equal basis. Some firms offer different parental leave
periods to "primary" and "nonprimary" caregivers. For example, one firm
34. See, e.g., NALP Directory, supra note 25 (workplace questionnaire for Baker & McKenzie
LLP's San Francisco office).
35. See Pat McGovern et al., Postpartum Health of Employed Mothers 5 Weeks After Childbirth, 4
ANNALS FAm. MED. 159, 159 (2006); see also Nev. Dep't Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721,
731 n.4 (2003) (citing legislative history of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act that describes a
disability period of four to eight weeks).
36. See, e.g., Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Compensation, http://www.wlrk.com/Page.cfm/
Thread/Recruiting/SubThread/Compensation (last visited Feb. 6, 2009) (providng women
a four month maternity disability leave). In addition, most firms' temporary disability
insurance programs provide additional medical leaves for particularly complicated
pregnancies; this type of leave is not considered in the analysis.
37. NALP Directory, supra note 25 (workplace questionnaire for Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP).
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offers twelve weeks of paid leave "for the lawyer with primary childcare
responsibility or up to three weeks [of paid leave] for the lawyer with
secondary childcare responsibility. '', 8 Although these programs appear gender
neutral, their application often relies on gendered assumptions. For example,
one firm offers a lengthy leave to "a birthmother who is the primary caregiver,"
and then offers a much shorter leave to all "male attorneys," ignoring the
possibility that male attorneys may be primary caregivers.39 Thus, parental
leave can be categorized as short (one to two weeks), moderate (four to six
weeks), generous (eight to twelve weeks), or primary/non-primary.4 °
The final type of leave offered is a catch-all category that includes family-
oriented leave periods, other than disability leave, which makes a distinction
based on gender. At one firm, a "paternity leave" is available to "male associates
and income partners, 41 while another firm explains that "[m]ale attorneys
receive four or six weeks, depending on the circumstances. '42 In most cases,
these policies offer men some paid time off at firms where women receive an
extended fixed disability leave.
38. Id. (workplace questionnaire for Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP).
39. NALP Directory, supra note 25 (workplace questionnaire for Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver &
Jacobson LLP). For a general description of men's difficulties with primary caregiver leaves,
see Cunningham, supra note 3, at 976-78.
40. Primary/nonprimary policies generally offer the primary caregiver a "generous" leave and
the nonprimary caregiver a "short" leave, though other combinations do exist.
41. McDermott Will & Emery, Careers at McDermott, http://careers.mwe.con/index.cfn/fa/
page.view/page-id/764ob739-9681-4c59-be8a-o3dd338bcoae/Benefits.cfm (last visited Feb.
6, 2009).
42. NALP Directory, supra note 25 (workplace questionnaire for Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver &
Jacobson LLP).
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Table 3.
SUMMARY OF THE TYPES OF LEAVE POLICIES.
Leave offered to women during the period in
'kcral which they are incapacitated from childbirth.
Fixed Normal Leave offered to women for a fixed period of
_4 to 8 weeks after childbirth.
Fixed Extended Leave offered to women for a fixed period of
io to 16 weeks after childbirth.
Short I to 2 weeks of leave offered to both parents.
Moderate 4 to 6 weeks of leave offered to both parents.
S8 to 12 weeks of leave offered to both3enerous arents.
Primary/NonPrimary
Leave of any length offered differently
,depending on whether the parent is the
"primary" caregiver.
Leave of any length that is not disability
leave and is offered to attorneys of one
D. Patterns in the Provision ofLeave
The firms analyzed here use some combination of the three general leave
types described above to create an overall policy. For example, combining a
moderate parental leave with a normal fixed disability leave results in "four
weeks paid leave for all new parents... plus eight weeks additional paid leave
for biological mothers because of short-term disability."43 Although the leave
policies are diverse, a number of patterns emerge.
First, fully half of the employers in the analysis mimic the example above,
and combine a disability leave for women with a parental leave that is equally
available to attorneys of both genders. Only seven of these firms, however, rely
on a woman's actual period of pregnancy disability; the rest use a fixed
disability leave ranging from four to sixteen weeks. Remarkably, for those
using fixed disability leave, only 52% of firms rely on a normal fixed disability
leave of four to eight weeks. The remaining firms offer extended fixed
disability leave of ten weeks or longer. Moreover, one quarter of fixed disability
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leaves are twelve weeks or longer, and two firms offer an astonishing sixteen
weeks of "disability" leave to new mothers. This pattern is particularly
remarkable because these firms have chosen explicitly to offer a parental leave
alongside their disability leave, which makes it all the more inexplicable that so
many offer extended disability periods. With respect to the parental leave
portion of the package, 17% of the firms in this group offer a generous parental
leave while 35% offer a brief parental leave of one or two weeks.
Excluding those firms that rely on the dominant model described above,
the remaining leave policies divide into a number of widely diverse categories.
Ten percent of employers in the sample, for example, provide no leave to men
at all and only offer a fixed disability leave to women. At the other extreme,
15% of firms offer identical leave to all attorneys - only a parental leave ranging
from four to twelve weeks. Thus, while many firms have decided to offer
identical benefits regardless of gender, nearly as many make no
accommodations for male attorneys. An additional 12% of firms offer a
permutation on the disability leave/parental leave combination by using an
explicitly gendered leave policy. These firms either offer different "maternity"
and "paternity" parental leave, or they offer an extended fixed disability leave
for women and a short parental leave available only to men. Finally, 13% of
firms use policies that distinguish between primary and nonprimary caregivers,
occasionally combining this with a disability leave, but generally casting the
entire policy in terms of caregiver status. Although this appears facially gender
neutral, Section III.C highlights the biased application of primary caregiver
leave.
These policies begin to illustrate the ways in which law firms conflate
childbearing (pregnancy-related disability leave) and childrearing (leave for the
purpose of raising children). Extended disability leave is the starkest example:
it confers a "disability" benefit that is in no way congruent with the effects of
normal pregnancy, thereby offering new mothers, but not new fathers, extra
time to bond with the baby. Some firms, recognizing the need to provide some
parental leave to men, react to this conflation by explicitly gendering their leave
policies, while other firms simply fail to provide meaningful leave to fathers.
Still other firms use primary and nonprimary caregiver distinctions in a failed
attempt to paper over the conflation of childbearing and childrearing leave.
Regardless of which policy employers utilize, male and female attorneys suffer
when firms design their leave policies in this way.44
44. See infra Part II.
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E. Law Firm Prestige and Leave Available
When all the components of the leave policies are combined, women
receive four to eighteen weeks of paid leave, while men receive zero to twelve
weeks of paid time off.4 Figure 1 illustrates these differences, plotting leave
available to men and women against law firm prestige as estimated by the
firm's rank in the Vault survey. 46 Each firm is represented by two points in the
graph-one for the leave it provides to women, and another for the leave it
provides to men. In addition, two trendlines, one for each gender, illustrate the
overall relationship between leave and prestige.
Figure 1.
LEAVE RECEIVED BY MEN AND WOMEN, BY FIRM RANK.
Total Leave Received, by Firm Ranking
Weeks of Leave
18 ; ,.q




8 40#4 - Women
6 0 0 0 - Men
4
0 0
0 20 40 6o 8o 100
Vault Rank
Focusing on leave available to women, it appears that more prestigious
firms tend to offer longer leave. Indeed, the length of maternity leave is weakly
but statistically significantly correlated with firm prestige (correlation
coefficient = -0.36; R2 = 0.13, p = 0.003), and the upper trendline in Figure 1
reflects this pattern. This correlation appears to be driven, at least in part, by
the fact that many of the fifteen most prestigious firms offer incredibly
See supra Section I.B.
There is a theoretical, though unlikely, potential for endogenity in this analysis: if attorneys
rating firms in the Vault survey evaluated parental leave as an indicator of prestige, then the
reasoning would be circular. For a discussion of Vault's measurement of prestige, see supra
note 6.
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generous maternity leave, lasting as long as eighteen weeks.47 Interestingly,
there is no correlation between firm prestige and the length of paternity leaves
(W7 = o.oo), and none of the fifteen top firms offer particularly generous leave
periods to male attorneys.
Indeed, the pattern with respect to prestige illustrates an assumption
underlying firms' failure to distinguish between childbearing and childrearing
leave. In the face of stiff competition for associates, prestigious firms feel
compelled to offer generous benefits to mothers, but have paid little attention
to the needs of attorney-fathers. As discussed below, however, male and female
attorneys are equally concerned about work-family conflicts, 48 and firms'
assumption that only women value parental leave may reflect inaccurate
stereotyping. In addition, the pattern illustrates that firms place a premium on
offering generous benefits to mothers. 49 Therefore, if the Title VII litigation
discussed below successfully encourages firms to provide longer paternity
47. Note, also, that two less prestigious firms offer incredibly short maternity leaves, which also
drives the correlation.
48. See, e.g., CATALYST, WOMEN IN LAW: MAKING THE CASE, 18-19 (2OO1) (showing that equal
numbers of men and women cite work-life balance as a professional concern).
49. In addition to prestige-based differences, there is interesting regional variation in the
provision of leave, based on the state in which the firm is based. With some exceptions, the
firms offer the same leave policy at all of their offices. But see, e.g., NALP Directory, supra
note 25 (workplace questionnaire for Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw LLP) (offering different
policies at the Chicago and Washington, D.C. offices). Nonetheless, there are observable
and statistically significant differences (p = 0.002) between firms based in different states.
Statistical analysis was based on a single variable Chi-squared test, indicating significance at
the level of the entire distribution. That is, some regions differ from other regions on some
variables. Table 3 illustrates these differences, presenting data for states with five or more
firms in the Vault rankings:
Table 3.
REGIONAL DIFFERENCES IN THE PROVISION OF LEAVE.
NATIONAL 11.9 3.9 34.9% 86
LSCALIFORNIA ..... . 114 2.7 ___ 4 ___3 --
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 11.1 4.3 42.6% 13
ILLINOIS 12-9 4.5 33.6% 8 ,
MASSACHUSETTS 13.4 ___4-4 32.8% 5
1 NEWYORK 12.8 .0 26.2% __
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benefits, reformers can be confident that firms will continue to offer
meaningful maternity leave."0
Overall, this analysis indicates that differences in the total amount of
maternity and paternity leave can be attributed to firms' combinations of policy
types: disability leave for women (actual, normal fixed, or extended fixed),
parental leave for both genders (brief, moderate, generous, or
primary/nonprimary), and explicitly gendered non-disability leave. The most
robust pattern that emerges from this classification is that firms repeatedly fail
to distinguish between leave provided to women for childbearing and leave
provided to both parents for childrearing. Extended disability leave and
primary caregiver policies conflate these concepts, and, as described in the next
Part, this conflation is problematic for attorneys of both genders.
II. LEAVE POLICIES AND GENDER DISCRIMINATION
Parental leave policies have, for over thirty years, exposed deep divisions
among feminist scholars and activists, illustrating tensions between the
rhetoric of equality and the goal of widely opening workplaces to women."' The
sheer variety of leave policies at prestigious and highly competitive law firms
illustrates that we are far from consensus on the best type of paid parental leave
policy or even on the criteria by which best should be measured. This Part
discusses how some of the leave policies described above, particularly those
that effectively offer generous childrearing benefits to women and little or no
analogous leave to men, reinforce stereotypes and ultimately place unnecessary
hurdles in front of male and female parent-attorneys. Section II.A provides an
overview of gender discrimination in law firms. Sections II.B and II.C trace
this discrimination to two outmoded but common assumptions in law firm
leave policies -women are caregivers, and only one parent will be responsible
for children.
A. Gender Discrimination in Law Firms
Women and parents are important constituencies within America's large
law firms. Women constitute 49% of new law firm associates. This fact alone
so. Of course, creating generous policies on paper is only part of the battle, and attorneys must
still be supported in the use of these policies.
51. See, e.g., KRISTINE M. BABER & KATHERINE R. ALLEN, WOMEN AND FAMILIES: FEMINIST
RECONSTRUCTIONS 190-95 (1992); MONA HARRINGTON, WOMEN LAWYERS: REWRITING THE
RULES 215-16 (1994).
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suggests that firms must pay some attention to the needs of female attorneys,
and, indeed, 93% of law firms have made some specific public commitment to
recruiting and retaining women. s2 Census data reveals that most women, like
most men, work outside the home when their children are young.s3 In the law
firm context, one survey found that 63% of female attorneys and an
astonishing 8o% of male attorneys have children.14 Women in law firms -like
men in law firms, or women in the workforce as whole-have both a family
and a career. But discrimination based on gender or family responsibilities
remains evident in many ways, from differences in compensation and
achievement to powerful accounts of subtle but systematic gender
stereotyping.
An annual survey by the National Association of Women Lawyers (NAWL)
provides a numerical portrait of women in country's 200 largest law firms."5
While women constitute nearly half of young associates and more than 40% of
senior associates, they make up only 26% of income partners and 16% of equity
partners. s6 Commentators have often attributed these differences to the
pipeline effect-the fact that many partners started practicing law before
women were admitted to firms in appreciable numbers.17 The NAWL data
challenges this explanation, however, demonstrating that women who
graduated from law school between 198o and 1995 made up nearly half of new
associates after their graduation, but constitute only 20% of the partners in
their cohort today -a result replicated in other studies. 58 Undoubtedly, gender
52. NAWL SURVEY, supra note 15, at 4.
53. See Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Employment
Characteristics of Families in 2007 (May 30, 20o8), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/
pdf/famee.pdf (noting that 71% of all mothers and 55% of mothers with children less than
one year old are in the labor force).
54. See Maria Pab6n L6pez, The Future of Women in the Legal Profession, 19 HASTINGS WOMEN'S
L.J. 53, 93 n.340 (20o8).
ss. NAWL SURVEY, supra note 15. NAWL's study considers the "American Lawyer Top-200."
Virtually all of the Vault Top-loo are contained in this sample. Id. at 19 n.5.
s6. Id. at 4.
57. See, e.g., Timothy L. O'Brien, Up the Down Staircase: Why Do So Few Women Reach the Top
of Big Law Firms, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 20o6 (Magazine), at 1 (explaining that many
assumed "once law school graduation rates substantially equalized between men and
women, that pipeline would fuel firm diversity and cause partnerships to equalize as well");
see also Marc Galanter, "Old and in the Way": The Coming Demographic Transformation of the
Legal Profession and Its Implicationsfor the Provision of Legal Services, 1999 Wis. L. REV. io81.
s8. See MORELLO, supra note 14 195-96 (1986) (quoting media accounts from the mid-eighties
that indicated no "entry level" discrimination against women); NAWL SURVEY, supra note
15, at 5; see also BARBARA A. CuRRAN, AM. BAR ASS'N, COMM'N ON WOMEN IN THE
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differences in partnership attainment must be attributed to a variety of factors,
only some of which might be formally termed discrimination. 9 A study by the
Women's Bar Association of the District of Columbia is only the most recent in
a chorus of voices insisting that discrimination interacts with and profoundly
influences women's choices in the profession.6
Similarly, women in large law firms are not paid as well as men. While
compensation for associates is generally governed by a system that leaves little
room for discretion (or discrimination), women partners and women in "of
counsel"' 6, positions are paid substantially less than men. Male counsels earn
11% more, male income partners earn 12% more, and male equity partners earn
16% more than their female peers. 62 Rigorous statistical analysis reveals that
income differences are related to a number of factors, including hours worked
and educational background, but these factors cannot account for the entire
gap. 6' Thus, the gender wage gap persists in the legal profession.
Perhaps most disturbingly, recent data indicates that, even today, only 53%
of female lawyers believe that they have the same career opportunities as male
colleagues. 6' That is, nearly half of the women practicing law today believe that
their employers treat them differently than they treat men, at least as far as
advancement is concerned. Moreover, the number of women who perceive this
disparity has actually increased since 1983, suggesting that women are
profoundly disillusioned with their prospects for success.6 s
PROFESSION, WOMEN IN THE LAW: A LOOK AT THE NUMBERS 49 (1995) (identifying the low
partnership rates of women who entered law firms after 1981).
59. See BERNARD F. LENTZ & DAVID N. LABAND, SEX DISCRIMINATION IN THE PROFESSION 32-48
(1995).
6o. WOMEN'S BAR AsS'N D.C., CREATING PATHWAYS TO SUCCESS FOR ALL: ADVANCING AND
RETAINING WOMEN IN TODAY'S LAW FIRMS 8 (2006) ("Men and women, partners and
associates, report similar levels and sources of work/life conflict, with all groups reporting
difficulties due to that conflict in the 70% range."); see also WILLIAMS, UNBENDING, supra
note 7, at 19-37.
61. "Of Counsel" or "Counsel" positions refer to senior attorneys who are not partners. The
term encompasses a variety of work arrangements, from senior attorneys who recently
joined the firm, to partially retired attorneys who still take on some projects.
6z. See NAWL SURVEY, supra note 15, at 8.
63. See, e.g., LENTZ & LABAND, supra note 59, at 29 (describing a number of statistical models in
which women earn less than men).
64. See Jennifer Gill, Q&A with American Bar Assn. President Martha Barnett,
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While these numbers are striking, one of the most commonly mentioned
attributes of discrimination in law firms is that it is subtle and difficult to
characterize or describe.66 Women are not stigmatized by overt beliefs that
they should not be partners, or that they do not deserve the same salaries.
Instead, their difficulties are anchored in assumptions about what it means to
be a woman lawyer. Furthermore, focusing on numbers alone obscures the
gender-based stereotyping that men experience in law firms. The literature on
sex discrimination in legal employment has illuminated a variety of stereotypes
about gender roles, family responsibilities, and employer beliefs, creating a
perception that lawyers with family responsibilities are not suited to large law
firms. These stereotypes impact attorney-parents of both genders in their
attempts to seek career and family satisfaction. 67
Some employers' assumptions about motherhood and lawyering grow
from the idea that a woman is not a "good mother" to her children if she
maintains a demanding career. Employers have been sued successfully for
actions based on these sorts of views,68 but they persist in the workplace.6 9 As
one writer observes, "[h]igh-powered female lawyers with kids are viewed as
suspect parents. ' 7' These sentiments are not exclusively by men; one female
managing partner, interviewed in Holly English's survey of women in law
firms, claims that "part time is the only way that you can give women a life of
quality in the child rearing years. '71 Employers consistently rely on these "good
mother" assumptions to the detriment of their female employees. 7' English
illustrates that many women in law firms have internalized these stereotypes,73
while John Hagan and Fiona Kay point to the tension between work and family
as a primary driver of unhappiness among some female attorneys.74
66. See infra notes 111-112 and accompanying text; see also JOHN HAGAN & FIONA KAY, GENDER IN
PRACTICE 161-62 (1995) (describing the subtlety of gender discrimination in law firms).
67. Gender discrimination theorists have also investigated the stereotype that women have
trouble with the ethos of cutthroat competition that permeates the practice of law. See, e.g.,
HAGAN & KAY, supra note 66, at 70.
68. See Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3 d 107 (2d Cir. 2004).
69. See, e.g., Reuter, supra note 16, at 1401 (describing employers' belief that "in order to be a
good mother, a woman must devote all of her time, energy, and attention to her child").
70. ENGLISH, supra note A8, at 230.
-p. Id. at 199.
72. See Joan C. Williams, Family Responsibilities Discrimination: The Next Generation of
Employment Discrimination Cases, 763 PLI/LIT 333, 354 (2007).
73. See ENGLISH, supra note 18, 230-33.
74. HAGAN & KAY, supra note 66, at 158.
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Employers also harbor "providership" or "breadwinner" stereotypes about
fatherhood, and men who deviate from this norm face consequences at work.75
Indeed, one scholar has gone so far as to call "breadwinning ... the great
unifying element in father's lives. ' ' 76 As one law firm partner insisted, when
"associates get married and become family men... [i]t means they work
harder" - presumably because having a family means providing a salary for a
wife and children.77 Fathers are not expected to have conflicts between work
and family, because their relationship with their children is supposed to be
defined primarily by the income raised to support them. 7  Moreover,
"[b]ecause of the extraordinary time and dedication required of lawyers, male
attorneys, more so than most working men, must forsake the role of 'good
father' in order to assume the role of 'good provider.' ' 79 When fathers deviate
from these assumptions and try to take on a more fulfilling role in childrearing,
they face "resistance, 'o "hostility,"s1 and workplace "consequences.
82
Recent scholarship has documented just how persistent these so-called
"domesticity" assumptions can be. Despite the changed structure of the
American economy and contemporary ideas about women's capabilities and
the importance of fatherhood, Joan Williams argues that we continue to rely on
traditional gender roles in organizing our family and professional lives."' Social
structures are organized around two types of individuals-an "ideal worker"
who is the family breadwinner and is willing to make any sacrifice for a career,
75. See Cunningham, supra note 3, at 997.
76. ROBERT L. GRISWOLD, FATHERHOOD IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 2 (1993).
77. ENGLISH, supra note 18, at 239.
78. See Cunningham, supra note 3, at 996 (describing the way in which the phrase "working
mother" but not "working father" embodies some sort of tension).
79. Heather A. Peterson, The Daddy Track: Locating the Male Employee Within the Family and
Medical Leave Act, 15 WASH U. J.L. & POL'Y 253, 275 (2004).
80. E.g., Martin H. Malin, Interference with the Right to Leave Under the Family and Medical Leave
Act, 7 EMP. RTS. &EMP. POL'Y J. 329, 345-46 (2003).
81. E.g., Debbie N. Kaminer, The Work-Family Conflict: Developing a Model of Parental
Accommodation in the Workplace, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 305, 318 (2004); Martin H. Malin, Fathers
and Parental Leave, 72 TEx. L. REv. 1047, 1077-79 (1994); Peterson, supra note 79, at 271-72.
82. ENGLISH, supra note 18, at 210.
83. See WILIAMS, UNBENDING, supra note 7, at 1-4. Today, only 24% of children are raised in
homes with only a father in the workforce. See JASON FIELDS, U.S. CENSUS BuREAu,
CHILDREN'S LIVING ARRANGEMENTS AND CHARACTERISTICS: MARCH 2002, at 9 (2003)
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2oo3pubs/p2o-547.pdf (showing that 20% of all
children live in two parent homes with only a father in the workforce, and an additional 4%
of children live in one parent homes with only a father in the workforce).
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and a caregiver who is economically marginalized.8" Although few families can
afford, or even desire, this archetypal arrangement, the feminist movement has
not altered its underlying structure.85 Modern female lawyers are perceived as
"ideal workers" until they have children, at which point they revert to
caregivers and experience stigma within the firm. Men, as perpetual ideal
workers, are assumed to have no caregiving responsibility and are thus unable
to participate fully in the raising of their children.
The same themes manifest themselves in employer assumptions about
attorneys' commitment to the firm and to their family. Many employers view
mothers as less committed to their work because they are presumed to be
focused on their children. Researchers have famously demonstrated that when
a female professional is late to work, her colleagues assume child care
difficulties, and when a male professional is late, colleagues assume a breakfast
meeting or a delayed train. 86 The women attorneys in English's survey report
that they did not perceive gender as an issue in their careers until they became
mothers. One woman pessimistically concluded that at her law firm, people
"were okay with having women as colleagues, [but they] were not okay with
having a mother as a colleague. 8' This is consistent with larger patterns in the
American economy-while the wage gap between men and women is
shrinking, the gap between "mothers and others" is widening.88 Thus, women
are hampered by their employers' beliefs that they cannot be committed
lawyers after they have children. One prominent scholar remarked that
"[e]very single woman I have spoken to" experienced discrimination after
returning from maternity leave.
8
,
84. See WILLIAMS, UNBENDING, supra note 7, at 1-4.
85. See id. at 8 (describing the "white picket fence in our heads" that is ever-present in
discussion about gender and families).
86. Joan C. Williams, Hibbs as a Federalism Case; Hibbs as a Maternal Wall Case, 73 U. CIN. L.
REV. 365, 389 (2004) ("[W]hen a mother is absent or late for work she is assumed to be
caring for her children; a similarly-situated father is assumed to be handling a work-related
issue.").
87 . ENGLISH, supra note 18, at 228.
88. WILLIAMS, UNBENDING, supra note 7, at 59. See, e.g., Michelle J. Budig & Paula England, The
Wage Penalty for Motherhood, 66 AM. SOC. REV. 204 (2001); Jane Waldfogel, The Effect of
Children on Women's Wages, 62 AM. SOC. REV. 209, 216 (1997); see also Joan C. Williams,
Keynote Address: Want Gender Equality? Die Childless at Thirty, 27 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 3, 3
(2006).
89. WILLIAMS, UNBENDING, supra note 7, at 69.
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Meanwhile, fathers are unable to make or articulate family commitments
and fear reprisals from their employers if they do.9" "The role of father is even
more rigidly defined than that of mother," writes one author," and this rigidity
underlies "male attorney[s'] fear of being perceived as less committed to the
firm" if they do ask for time to care for children." Men who need time away
from the office to address their own health problems are hardly noticed, but
men who need time for family-related reasons experience reputational
sanctions. 93  One senior attorney in English's study paints with a
characteristically broad brush, remarking that
the guys don't need to leave to get the kid out of day care, or stay
home when the kid is sick, or take the kid to the doctor, or any of
those things that take time away from the clients. But of course the
lady lawyer has to do those things.94
While it is a particularly unlikely proposition that the fathers in this firm
are never responsible for child care, the sentiment is by no means unusual.
Moreover, this statement perfectly encapsulates the relationship between
commitment, domesticity, and stereotypes. The partner focuses on female
attorneys' family commitments, and every time a woman leaves to "get the kid
out of day care" the assumption is affirmed. Moreover, this statement bluntly
assumes that "guys don't need to leave" for family reasons, making it difficult
for male attorneys' to assert their own caregiving responsibilities. In one
stroke, the partner has questioned women's commitment to their career and
undermined fathers' flexibility to participate in their children's lives.
Ultimately, sex discrimination in law firms is rooted in a complex set of
assumptions about gender roles, family dynamics, and attorney capabilities.
With this overview, one can explore the ways in which parental leave interacts
with and helps perpetuate these stereotypes. The following discussion focuses
on the most grossly disproportionate leave policies - those which provide
maternity leave benefits well in excess of pregnancy-related disability but offer
no comparable benefit to fathers -as described in Part I. Section II.B first
addresses how disproportionate leave reinforces assumptions about women,
go. See, e.g., ENGLISH, supra note 18, at 210 (describing men's fear of "abuse" because of family
commitments); see also sources cited supra notes 8o-8i.
91. ENGLISH, supra note 18, at 238.
92. Peterson, supra note 79, at 275.
93. See Cunningham, supra note 3, at 994.
94. ENGLISH, supra note 18, at 229-30.
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illustrating how these policies caricature female attorneys. Section II.C then
considers more complicated relationships, exploring how leave policies embody
and enforce assumptions about family dynamics.
B. Leave Policies and Assumptions About Women
Although firms may design their maternity and parental leave policies
around their assumptions about families, these same policies also can reinforce
employer stereotypes that women and mothers are not meant for or committed
to law firm work. The classic sociological account of stereotypes focuses on
evidence processing-when individuals observe evidence consistent with their
background assumptions, they focus on it and remember it, but inconsistent
evidence is largely ignored.9" When a law firm provides a sixteen-week
maternity leave without offering male attorneys a single day off, each birth in
an attorney's family becomes a stereotype-reinforcing event. Supervisors are
given four months to reflect on a woman's absence from the firm and how her
motherhood will change her legal career. They are also given the opportunity
to slap a male colleague on the back and admire the baby pictures after only a
few days, reinforcing breadwinner assumptions about fatherhood. In the less
frequent case where a male attorney uses accumulated vacation to stay home
with a newborn, or a female attorney quickly returns to work, the employer
ignores the evidence or sees these two individuals as outliers. 96 In contrast,
when female attorneys take sixteen-week leaves, and male attorneys are offered
and regularly take advantage of ten or twelve week leaves, supervisors and
colleagues are provided with overwhelming evidence that can dissolve or soften
their assumptions about parenting and lawyering. 97
9S. See, e.g., Galen V. Bodenhausen, Stereotypic Biases in Social Decision Making and Memory, 55 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 726 (1988); Marilynn B. Brewer & Roderick M. Kramer, The
Psychology of Intergroup Attitudes and Behavior, 36 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 219 (1985); Patricia G.
Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudices: Their Automatic and Controlled Components, 56 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5 (1989). For an excellent overview of this literature in the
context of employer perceptions of men and women taking family leave under the FMLA,
see Malin, supra note 8o, at 337-49.
96. See Brewer & Kramer, supra note 95, at 222 (discussing stereotype subtyping). The problem
is compounded by evidence that even when leave is available, male attorneys are unlikely to
avail themselves of whatever limited leave is provided. See generally Ariel Meysam Ayanna,
Aggressive Parental Leave Incentivizing: A Statutory Proposal Toward Gender Equalization in the
Workplace, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 293 (2007) (stressing the importance of equal leave-
taking and proposing compensation schemes to accomplish it).
97. See Ayanna, supra note 96.
1204
118:118 2 200 9
CHILDBEARING, CHILDREARING, AND TITLE VII
Primary caregiver leave can operate in a similar way. These policies can be
facially gender-neutral, but often are applied in gendered ways. 98 For instance,
women are automatically considered the primary caregiver and entitled to long
leaves, while men must often specially petition their employers if they wish to
take an extended parental leave."0 These policies provide the same
opportunities to reinforce assumptions about motherhood, but may be even
more pernicious for two reasons. First, they attach labels-primary caregiver
and nonprimary caregiver-to individuals taking parental leave. To the extent
anyone within the firm notices or uses these distinctions, they offer further
evidence that fathers should not have childcare responsibilities and mothers
have little room for a legal career."° Second, as discussed in more detail below,
they reinforce employer conceptions of the way families run-with one career
and one caregiving parent-even if they provide nominal flexibility for the
caregiver to be the father.
Finally, disproportionate leave policies can reinforce stereotypes for another
group of lawyers: those interviewing for positions with the firm. Despite the
fact that it is plainly illegal to ask about marriage, family, or childcare
commitments in job interviews, female attorneys still believe that those topics
are being probed. 0 1 Moreover, recruiting tactics that encourage employers to
focus on the family-friendly qualities at their law firms only reinforce the biases
that the ban on family-status questions is supposed to eliminate. When no
parental leave is available to men, employers have no reason to discuss it with
potential male hires, but they are encouraged to tell women about the generous
maternity leave policies. This only reminds the hiring attorneys of women's
potential family commitment and emphasizes the "gender-based assumption
that a particular female worker will assume caretaking responsibilities."" 2
98. See infra Section III.C.
99. Cunningham, supra note 3, at 972.
ioo. See Bodenhausen, supra note 95, at 727 (discussing the effects of labeling when a mixcd set
of evidence is presented).
1o1. See LENTZ&LABAND, supra note 59, at 87-88.
102. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: UNLAWFUL
DISPARATE TREATMENT OF WORKERS WITH CAREGIVING RESPONSIBILITIES 11 (2007)
(emphasis added), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/caregiving.pdf; see also id.
at 12 (emphasizing that it is illegal to "assume that childcare responsibilities will make
female employees less dependable than male employees").
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C. Leave Policies and Assumptions About Family Dynamics
It is fairly straightforward and uncontroversial to argue that women who
do not take on primary responsibility for raising children, or whose caregiving
responsibilities are no greater than their male colleagues, should not face
stereotypes that do not apply to them. But the situation for parent-attorneys is
substantially more complicated, and employer stereotypes are rooted in the
reality of many working families' lives. Countless studies demonstrate that
women, even in families with two high-status professionals, take on the
majority of the caregiving responsibility. °3 Women are responsible for 8o% of
the childcare duties in American households, and even the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) acknowledges that "women actually do
assume the bulk of caretaking responsibilities in most families."'01 4 Law firms
might reasonably protest that they offer long maternity leaves and short
paternity leaves because that is what the attorneys want, and that they have to
offer short leaves to men to be able to afford long leaves for women. But this
Section demonstrates how parental leave policies can actually contribute to the
continued dominance of these patterns. It begins by describing feminist
objections to the ideal worker norm, then rebuts the rhetoric of women's and
men's choices, and finally applies these concepts to law firm leave policies.
As described above, feminist theorists have argued that workplaces are built
around the norm of an ideal worker -a person who has access to an unlimited
"flow" of childcare assistance from a spouse and has no pressing
responsibilities beyond commitment to their career.' The concept has been
developed in great detail in the feminist literature,"6 and the core objection is
that the norm is centered on an inherently gendered view of the family.
Activists, in this view, should focus on more than simply guarding against
overt discrimination. If success continues to require ideal worker status as an
essential component, then few women will be successful -because women
rarely have access to the flow of domestic services that ideal workers require."0 7
103. See, e.g., WILLIAMS, UNBENDING, supra note 7, at 2.
104. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, supra note 102, at 11.
105. WILLIAMS, UNBENDING, supra note 7, at 5.
io6. See, e.g., TERRI APTER, WORKING WOMEN DON'T HAVE WIVES: PROFESSIONAL SUCCESS IN
THE 199OS (1993); MARY BLAIR-LoY, COMPETING DEVOTIONS 1-2 (2003) (discussing
competing work and family "schema"); LESLIE F. STEBBINS, WORK AND FAMILY IN AMERICA
(2001); UNFINISHED WORK: BUILDING EQUALITY AND DEMOCRACY IN AN ERA OF WORKING
FAMILIES (Jody Heymann & Christopher Beem eds., 2005); WILLIAMS, UNBENDING, supra
note 7, at 1-39.
107. See, e.g., APTER, supra note io6, at 1-1o; WILLIAMS, UNBENDING, supra note 7, at 5.
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Instead, the focus should be on changing workplaces so individuals who are
not ideal workers for certain periods of their careers can still achieve. Central to
this is the goal of "enabling workers to take more time for caregiving" without
penalizing them in the workplace. °O Though less clearly articulated in the
literature, eliminating the ideal worker norm also requires deconstructing the
assumption that one parent will provide a flow of childcare responsibility on
which the other can rely. Moreover, there is ample evidence in the social
sciences literature that populating workplaces with "non-ideal" workers will
increase productivity and is a feasible reform goal.' 9
It is within this framework that many observers have objected to assertions
that women with children make a choice to exit the workforce, reduce their
participation, or minimize their professional commitments. Joan Williams
insists that "mothers' marginalization reflects not mere choice; it also reflects
discrimination ..... In this view, women's choices are constrained by the fact
that it is impossible for them to become ideal workers. As one author observes,
"[F]emale lawyers often feel pushed into that choice [to exit or minimize their
career] and would prefer to maintain their careers and a family if a structure
existed that allowed them to do so"'" Indeed, women are "caught in a double
bind between the competing models of the ideal worker and ideal parent,"
making meaningful choice difficult."2 Certainly no one disputes that many
women make these sorts of choices and that they are satisfied with their
decisions. But it is also inaccurate to assume that all women can be
characterized in such a manner.
Nor can we say that men freely choose their more limited family
commitments. Men repeatedly explain that they are concerned about or have
personally experienced supervisor and coworker intolerance of their
io8. Anita Garey, Far From Ideal, WOMEN'S REV. BOOKS, Dec. 1999, at 17, 18.
iog. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Glass & Sarah Beth Estes, The Family Responsive Workplace, 23 ANN.
REV. Soc. 289, 296-97 (1997) (discussing how work-life conflict decreases productivity);
Alison M. Konrad & Robert Mangel, The Impact of Work-Life Programs on Firm Productivity,
21 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1225, 1231-36 (2000) (discussing how "work-life programs" improve
productivity); Susan J. Lambert, Added Benefits: The Link Between Work-Life Benefits and
Organizational Citizenship Behavior, 43 ACAD. MGMT. J. 8oi, 8ol (2000) (offering a model of
how work-life benefits can improve "organizational citizenship" and "job performance");
Amy L. Wax, Family-Friendly Workplace Reform: Prospects for Change, ANNALS AM. AcAD.
POL. & SOC. Sci., Nov. 2004, at 36.
i1o. WILLIAMS, UNBENDING, supra note 7, at 37.
mii. O'Brien, supra note 57, at i.
112. Pamela Stone & Meg Lovejoy, Fast Track Women and the "Choice" To Stay Home, ANNALS
AM. AcAD. POL. & SOC. Sci., Nov. 2004, at 62.
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childrearing commitments."3 Growing from a "societal stereotype ... that men
are less attached to their children," more than 6o% of fathers worry their
supervisors will not approve if they take more than four weeks of paternity
leave."14 One man poignantly insisted that when fathers take time for their
children, they do so "as quietly as possible because we fear for our jobs if word
gets out.""'  Keith Cunningham-Parmeter paints a stark picture of men at
American law firms, explaining a male partner's assessment that child care "is
not a macho thing to do."",6 Another observer explains that when a man insists
on time away from work because of family commitments, he "may face the
assumption not only that he is a less competent worker, but that he is, overall,
somehow lacking as a person."11 7 An oft-quoted, though now dated, study
revealed that fully 63% of large employers believed that it was "unreasonable"
for men to take even a single day of paternity leave after a child was born. 8 A
less rigorous but somewhat more recent investigation found that "almost two-
thirds of chief executive officers and human resources directors believed that
'none' was a reasonable paternity leave following the arrival of child,"
suggesting that, at the very least, progress in this field is slow. 19 Men's choices
are profoundly influenced by this workplace hostility. A recent study revealed
that male and female law school graduates are equally concerned about "work-
life balance."' 2 Thus, just as discrimination rooted in the ideal worker norm
hinders mothers' professional accomplishment, so, too, does it restrain fathers'
family commitments.
The role of disproportionate parental leave policies within this wider
narrative is clear. A sixteen-week leave for women, without offering a single
day off for men, represents a classic manifestation of the ideal worker
113. See generally ENGLISH, supra note 18, at 238-42 (describing the predicament of "[d]ads in a
[b]ox"); STEBBINS, supra note 1o6, at 31-32 (highlighting men's work-family conflicts);
Cunningham, supra note 3, at 976-78 (discussing difficulties men have in taking primary
caregiver leave); Joan C. Williams et al., Law Firms as Defendants: Family Responsibilities
Discrimination in Legal Workplaces, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 393, 410-11 (2007).
114. Chuck Halverson, From Here to Paternity: Why Men Are Not Taking Paternity Leave Under the
Family and Medical Leave Act, 18 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 257, 262 (2003); Janet Shibley Hyde
et al., Parental Leave: Policy and Research, 52J. SOC. ISSUES 91, 105 (1996).
115. Martin H. Malin, Fathers and Parental Leave Revisited, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 25, 42 (1998).
116. Cunningham, supra note 3, at 977.
117. Williams & Segal, Relief, supra note 7, at 102.
118. CATALYST, REPORT ON A NATIONAL STUDY OF PARENTAL LEAVEs 65 (1986). The study
considered large employers generally, not law firms.
119. Judith S. Kaye & Anne C. Reddy, The Progress of Women Lauyers at Big Firms: Steadied or
Simply Studied?, 76 FOpDHAM L. REV. 1941, 1957 (2008) (describing a 1999 study).
120. CATALYST, supra note 48, at 18-19.
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assumption that men should not need time off for newborns because they, as
ideal workers, have unlimited childcare assistance. At the same time, new
mothers are no longer ideal workers and will be marginalized in the firm.
Similarly, policies that define certain parents as the primary caregiver only
reinforce the law firms' beliefs that households will be organized so that one
parent provides the other with a flow of domestic support. It is no wonder,
then, that couples with two high-status professionals feel as if their lives are
unsustainable, 2' since neither parent has the unlimited support employers
seem to expect. More subtly, leave policies can also suggest to new parents
what the proper, or perhaps simply prudent, organization of their family
should be. With one parent entitled to weeks of time off, and the other entitled
to little or no leave, it is easy to establish the patterns that lead to women
providing the vast majority of the child care. One observer calls these sorts of
policies a "self-fulfilling prophecy" because the mother, able to take an
extended leave, becomes the "expert caregiver" and then maintains that role in
years to come.'22 Certainly, law firms are not responsible for outside social
pressures that shape their employees' decisions. Nonetheless, grossly uneven
leave policies assume the correctness of those pressures, and inappropriately
make conforming decisions all but inevitable.
The objections described above follow logically from a school of feminist
thought that emphasizes and combats the stereotypes of domesticity.'23 But,
without rehashing the sameness/difference debates of previous decades," it is
important to recognize that the very existence of maternity leave is an enduring
accomplishment of earlier waves of the feminist movement. 25 Indeed, to the
activists who so aggressively fought for the passage of the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act (PDA), the central battle was securing employers'
minimum tolerance for mothers in the workplace. 26 Following this legacy, it is
121. Cf Rosalind C. Barnett & Nancy L. Marshall, Gender and the Relationship Between Job
Experiences and Psychological Distress: A Study of Dual-Earner Couples, 64 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 794 (1993) (describing how men and women in dual-earner couples react to
professional stress).
122. Cunningham, supra note 3, at 978.
123. WILLIAMS, UNBENDING, supra note 7, at 1-6.
124. See, e.g., Rosemary C. Salomone, Myths and Realities in the Sameness'Dfference Debate, ii
CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 583 (2005).
125. See USE VOGEL, MOTHERS ON THE JOB 9-43 (1993) (describing the evolution of maternity
benefits).
126. By way of illustration, the plaintiff in Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), the first major
pregnancy discrimination case, was fired simply for leaving work long enough to deliver her
child.
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easy to see how one might welcome longer maternity benefits as a signal of
greater employer recognition of women, and might argue that a sixteen-week
maternity leave suggests that an employer is fully committed to keeping new
mothers on its staff. Certainly, the law firms who have these policies will be
quick to offer this justification. Nonetheless, by offering generous benefits to
new mothers but not new fathers, these employers are taking an unmistakable
position on what motherhood and fatherhood should mean to their employees.
Just as earlier feminists worked to ensure that women had a choice to have a
baby and a career if they so chose, those working to increase equity in leave
policies seek to ensure that parents of both genders have meaningful choices in
the way they structure their work and family lives.
In sum, disproportionate parental leave reinforces problematic stereotypes.
The policies allow employers to assume that motherhood undermines a legal
career without regard to the particular mother or the particular career. But they
do more than simply assume women into roles they may not take on. Grossly
uneven leave policies also reinforce a family dynamic that is ultimately
unsatisfying to both parties -the (female) marginalized caregiver who cannot
embrace a career, and the (male) ideal worker who cannot participate in a
family. Until employers abandon these assumptions, attorneys of both genders
will continue to express profound dissatisfaction with the "work-life" conflict
in their lives and firms will unnecessarily lose talented employees. The
workforce need not wait patiently for employers to realize their mistake; as
Part III illustrates, disproportionate leave policies are extremely vulnerable to a
Title VII challenge for discrimination on the basis of sex.
III.TITLE VII CHALLENGES TO LEAVE POLICIES
Given the potential harm that these notably uneven leave policies can cause,
this Part investigates the viability of Title VII challenges alleging sex-based
discrimination in the provision of parental leave. In particular, policies that
offer incredibly generous benefits to women and no leave to men may be
vulnerable on straightforward claims of facial discrimination on the basis of
sex. In addition, certain facially neutral leave policies that distinguish between
primary and nonprimary caregivers may also be susceptible to a "sex-plus"
disparate treatment challenge by male attorneys who consider themselves
primary caregivers but find they are unable to use their firm's more generous
leave provisions. Although these suits would almost certainly be brought by
men, the discussion in Part II suggests that more paid leave for men and less
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Despite their position in the legal hierarchy, law firms are not immune
from suit. In 1984, the Supreme Court established that law firms were
colorable Title VII defendants.' 7 One recent study uncovered thirty-three
recent cases where legal employers, including many large law firms, have been
sued under Title VII for discriminating on the basis of gender and caregiving
responsibility,, 8 While the study was unable to find any suits brought by male
attorneys," 9 the discussion below suggests that grossly disproportionate leave
policies may provide an excellent target. To understand the framework in
which a Title VII challenge should be situated, Section III.A provides an
overview of federal law on a pregnancy and parental leave. Section III.B argues
that leave policies that provide as much as twelve or sixteen weeks of disability
leave to women and offer little or no leave to men are facially discriminatory
under existing law. Section III.C describes how primary/nonprimary caregiver
policies may also be challenged based on the way in which they are applied to
male attorneys. Finally, Section III.D explores factors that may explain firms'
persistence in offering these policies and attorneys' failure to instigate legal
action to date.
A. Development of Federal Law
Supreme Court jurisprudence on the relationship between Title VII and
parental leave has followed a circuitous route. While many of the key principles
are found in Title VII decisions, a number of important concepts can also be
drawn from equal protection jurisprudence and other federal law. As described
below, the Court's initial conclusion that pregnancy did not create a leave
entitlement was overruled by the PDA. 3' Interpretation of that statute has
127. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
128. See Williams et a]., supra note 113, at 395, 404-10; see also Gallina v. Mintz, Levin, Cohn,
Ferris, Glovsky & Popeo, P.C., 123 F. App'x 558 (4 th Cir. 2005) (finding for the attorney on a
claim of gender discrimination); Kennedy v. Schoenberg, Fisher & Newman, Ltd., 14o F.3d
716 (7th Cir. 1998) (allowing a claim to go to trial when a female attorney's boss allegedly
told her she should stay home with her children); Sigmon v. Parker Chapin Flattau &
Klimpl, 9o F. Supp. 667 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding for the attorney on a claim of pregnancy
discrimination); Capruso v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Group, Inc., 2003 WL 1872653 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. lo, 2003); Wynn & Wynn, P.C. v. Mass. Comm'n Against Discrimination, 729 N.E.2d
1o68 (Mass. 2000); Kimberly Blanton, Lawyer Accuses Firm of Pregnancy Bias: Says Goodwin
Procter Denied Her Partnership, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 13, 2003, at Ei (describing a pregnancy
discrimination case).
129. See Williams et al., supra note 113, at 410.
130. Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, § 1, 92 Stat. 2076, 2076 (1978) (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 20ooe(k)).
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shaped the boundaries of parental leave, as has the passage of the Family and
Medical Leave Act of 1993. (FMLA).' 3' Taken together, the developments
require maternity leave for many employed women, while also affirming a
baseline commitment to gender equality in the provision of leave.
In Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., an early Title VII case, the Court
established that discrimination against women because they are mothers can
constitute "discrimination on the basis of sex. ' 132 In that 1971 per curiam
opinion, the Court easily concluded that a hiring policy which excluded
mothers, but not fathers, of young children could violate Title VII 33 This
holding formed the basis for sex-plus theories of discrimination, which
prohibit policies where "an employer classifies employees on the basis of sex
plus another characteristic, such as parenthood, race, marital status or child-
bearing ability.' 1 3
4
The Court first attempted to address issues specifically related to parental
leave in Geduldig v. Aiello. 35 In that 1974 case, pregnant women challenged a
California program that provided paid disability benefits to most disabled
private employees, but specifically excluded any disability "arising in
connection with pregnancy.' ' 36 Justice Stewart held that California's decision
not to cover pregnancy-related disabilities is not "invidious discrimination
under the Equal Protection Clause."' 37 Similarly, in General Electric Co. v.
Gilbert, the Court held that an employer's disability benefit package that
excluded pregnancy did not "discriminate on the basis of sex" within the
131. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 2601-2654 (2000)).
132. 411 F.2d 1, 2 (5th Cir. 1969), affid, 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam).
133. 400 U.S. at 544. The opinion left open the possibility of a bona fide occupational
qualification defense by the employer. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring).
134. Ellen M. Martin, Anne 0. Martinson & Claire Frost, Evolving Theories of Discrimination
Under Title VII, 746 PLI/LIT 1il (2006); see also City of L.A. Dept. of Waste & Power v.
Manhart 435 U.S. 702 (1978) (finding for a female plaintiff on a sex-plus theory); Fisher v.
Vassar Coll., 114 F.3d 1332 (2d Cir. 1997) (discussing the remedy by which an employee can
recover under a sex-plus theory as a member of two different protected classes); Miller v.
Grand Holdings, Inc., No. 04-2688, 2005 WL 1745639, at *8 (D. Minn. July 26, 2005)
("[C]ourts have considered familial status in analyzing gender discrimination claims under
a 'sex plus' theory."). For a general discussion of sex-plus claims under Title VII, see Wendi
Barish, Comment, "Sex-Plus" Discrimination: A Discussion of Fisher v. Vassar College, 13
HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 239 (1995); and Regina E. Gray, Comment, The Rise and Fall of the"Sex-
Plus" Discrimination: An Analysis of Fisher v. Vassar College, 42 How. L.J. 71 (1998).
135. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
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meaning of Title VII.138 Justice Rehnquist emphasized that the plan was
"facially nondiscriminatory in the sense that '[t]here is no risk from which men
are protected and women are not."'139 With these two cases, the Court clearly
established that there was no existing federal right to pregnancy leave.
Gilbert generated public outrage and a swift congressional response. In
1978, Congress passed the PDA, which overruled Gilbert and amended Title
VII:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not
limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or
related medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for
all employment-related purposes... as other persons not so affected
but similar in their ability or inability to work .... 40
Thus, under the PDA, employers must not make hiring decisions on the basis
of pregnancy, and are required to offer pregnancy-related benefits if they also
offer similar disability benefits.'41
With the issue presented in Gilbert clearly settled by statute, the Court was
called upon to interpret the PDA under very different circumstances in 1987.
The plaintiffs in California Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra challenged a
California law that required employers to provide pregnancy leave, whether or
not they provided benefits for other disabilities. 4 The Court held that the
California statute, which was admittedly more protective of pregnancy than
other conditions, did not require employers to violate the PDA and was not
preempted by federal law. Although the PDA's plain language demanded that
pregnancy "shall be treated the same" as other disabilities, Justice Marshall's
plurality opinion investigated congressional motivations underlying the Act
and concluded that this language was not intended to "impos[e] a limitation
138. 429 U.S. 125, 133 (1976).
139. Id. at 138 (quoting Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496-97).
140. Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, § 1, 92 Stat. 2076, 2076 (1978) (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 20ooe(k)).
141. Id. For a discussion of the PDA, see Julie Manning Magid, Pregnant with Possibility, 38 AM.
Bus. L.J. 819 (2001); and Melissa Feinberg, Note, After California Federal Savings & Loan v.
Guerra: The Parameters of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 31 ARiz. L. REv. 141 (1989). See
also Jamie L. Clanton, Toward Eradicating Pregnancy Discrimination at Work, 86 IOwA L. REV.
703 (2001).
142. 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
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on the remedial purpose of the PDA. '' 43 Instead, "preferential treatment of the
disadvantaged class" was consistent with Title VII."
Four years later, in International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,"45 the Court
added nuance to this analysis by invalidating an employer's "Fetal Protection
Policy" that prohibited hiring fertile (but nonpregnant) women into positions
that would pose risks to a fetus if the women became pregnant. 46 The Court
concluded that the policy not only plainly discriminated on the basis of sex, but
also represented an illegal "classifi [cation] on the basis of potential for
pregnancy."47 The majority opinion remarked that "the absence of a
malevolent motive does not convert a facially discriminatory policy into a
neutral policy with a discriminatory effect. ' '14' The fact that the fetal protection
policy was designed to protect potential children, not to hinder women's
careers, was not relevant to the Court's Title VII analysis.
In 1993, Congress passed the FMLA. 149 The FMLA guarantees eligible
employees twelve weeks of unpaid leave to care for a newborn or newly
adopted child, to attend to a seriously ill child, parent, or spouse, or to address
an employee's own serious health condition.' The Act applies without regard
to the employee's gender, but only covers large employers and excludes some
highly paid employees from its terms.'
Before its final passage, the FMLA was vetoed twice by President George
H.W. Bush, who expressed concern about its impact on American business." 2
143. Id. at 277 n.6, 285.
144. Id. at 293 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). See generally
Feinberg, supra note 141 (discussing Guerra). In Miller-Wohl Co. v. Comm'r of Labor &
Indus., 479 U.S. 1050 (1987), the Court considered a similar policy promulgated by the State
of Montana and challenged on equal protection grounds. The Court remanded the case for
reconsideration in light of its Guerra decision. Id.
145. 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
146. Id. at 193, 197; see also Clanton, supra note 141, at 712-13.
147. Int'l Union, 499 U.S. at 199. The Court reasoned that the policy violated the plain language
of section 703 of the Civil Rights Act, and the policy constituted discrimination on the basis
of pregnancy, as prohibited by the PDA amendments appearing in section 701.
148. Id. at 199.
149. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 26Ol-2654 (2000)).
150. 29 U.S.C. 5 2612(a)(1).
151. Id. §§ 2611(2)(B), 2614 (b).
152. Charles L. Baum, Has Family Leave Legislation Increased Leave-Taking?, 15 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL'Y 93, 94 (2004) (discussing the impact of the FMLA on family leave-taking); Stephen
Kurkjian, Bush Vetoes Family Leave Legislation, BOSTON GLOBE, June 30, 199o, at Ai (citing
President Bush's concerns regarding job creation and preservation).
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The coalition of supporters that ultimately secured the Act's passage was
motivated by different interests and competing agendas, and over the last
twenty-five years different aspects of the enacting rationale have borne
emphasis. For example, in the mid-nineties, observers described the Act as
presenting a unified national policy for pregnancy leave, focusing on the
physical disability suffered during pregnancy and postpartum.'53 Recent
scholarship has tended to focus on the FMLA's gender neutrality, however, and
authors have described the Act as a congressional attempt to "transform gender
expectations about the allocation of responsibility for family-care obligations as
between men and women.'
54
The Supreme Court focused on this second rationale when it interpreted
the Act ten years after its passage. The FMLA applies to states as employers,
and Congress also authorized a damages remedy against the, states. Nevada
Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs' required the Court to determine
whether this was a valid waiver of state sovereign immunity-a question that
turned on the legitimacy of the FMLA as an exercise of the remedial power
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 6 In holding that the waiver of
sovereign immunity was valid, Chief Justice Rehnquist's sweeping opinion
focused on evidence before Congress that many states "continue[d] to rely on
invalid gender stereotypes... specifically in the administration of leave
benefits." 1 7 Hibbs is, strictly speaking, a decision about the scope of Congress's
Section Five remedial power, but it reflects important themes in the Court's
contemporary thinking on parental leave. Indeed, both the majority opinion
and Justice Kennedy's dissent suggested that state laws granting more "family-
leave time to women than to men" would constitute impermissible "gender-
based discrimination" in contravention of Title VII.S8
153. See, e.g., Sabra Craig, Note, The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993: A Survey of the Act's
History, Purposes, Provisions, and Social Ramifications, 44 DRAKE L. REV. 51, 53 (1995).
154. Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power:
Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 2017 (2003);
see also Nina G. Golden, Pregnancy and Maternity Leave: Taking Baby Steps Towards Effective
Policies, 8 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 1, 11 (2006).
155. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
156. See id. at 726.
157. Id. at 730. See generally Reva B. Siegel, You've Come a Long Way, Baby: Rehnquist's New
Approach to Pregnancy Discrimination in Hibbs, 58 STAN. L. REv. 1871 (20c6); id. at 1873
(describing Hibbs's focus on discrimination against "mothers and mothers-to-be").
158. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 739-40 & n.12; id. at 756 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also infra text
accompanying notes 173-184.
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While the case law on gender and family responsibilities discrimination in
employment is much richer than the overview provided in this Section,' s9 with
this background Sections III.B and III.C turn to the viability of Title VII
challenges to law firm leave policies.
B. Challenging Extended Disability Leave
Law firm leave policies that provide extremely extended fixed disability
leave to women while offering little or no leave to men violate Title VII's
prohibition on sex discrimination. Fixed disability leave itself is not
problematic-it may simplify administration and provide women some
comfort that they are adjusting normally. It is problematic, however, when the
disability period extends well beyond the normal disability associated with
childbirth -transforming it from childbearing leave into childrearing leave not
available on an equal and nongendered basis.
It is particularly useful to focus on policies that provide fixed pregnancy
disability leave of twelve weeks or longer, while offering no parental leave.
Seven firms analyzed in this study have policies that meet these criteria. Two
firms provide a sixteen-week fixed disability leave to women, and offer no
parental leave to male attorneys. Estimates of postpartum disability cluster
around six weeks, with some estimates reaching as high as eight weeks;160
therefore, these policies effectively provide an additional two month leave to
women with normal pregnancies and offer no comparable benefit to men.
Similarly, five firms offer a twelve week fixed disability leave and no parental
leave. 6 '
Guerra6 2 does not create an absolute barrier to Title VII suits challenging
pregnancy policies. Certainly, the Court's decision in Guerra established that
159. See, e.g., Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (articulating a
broad standard for employer retaliation under Title VII); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (articulating a new test for making out a prima facie case);
Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F. 3d 107, 121 (2d Cir. 2004)
(relaxing the requirement for proof of more favorable treatment of a member of the
unprotected group).
16o. See McGovern et al., supra note 35, at 159; see also H.R. REP. No. 101-28, pt. 1, at 30 (1989)
(citing four to eight weeks as the range of estimates for normal recovery times).
161. Four firms combine twelve weeks of disability leaves with two to four weeks of parental
leave, and eight firms offer a ten or eleven weeks of disability leave combined with one or
two weeks of parental leave. Indeed, these policies may be vulnerable to the types of legal
challenges described in this Section, but the analysis focuses on the seven firms with the
most egregious policies.
16z. 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
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states and employers can treat pregnancy more favorably than other
disabilities. But close reading of that decision- particularly in light of Hibbs
and other more recent developments -indicates that Guerra is unlikely to
protect twelve-to-sixteen-week fixed disability leave.
Guerra is cited widely for its core holding that the PDA does not prohibit
policies that treat pregnancy more favorably than other conditions. Justice
Marshall's plurality opinion drew a sharp distinction, however, between
pregnancy classifications that "reflect archaic or stereotypical notions about
pregnancy,"' 6 3 and California's policy, which was "narrowly drawn to cover
only the period of actual physical disability on account of pregnancy."16 4 Justice
Marshall used the word "reasonable" to describe the length of the permitted
leave policies on six occasions. 6 ' A sixteen-week disability leave for normal
pregnancy, however, is hardly "reasonable" or "narrowly drawn." Instead, it
reflects "archaic or stereotypical notions" and is thus not freed from Title VII
liability.'
66
The Third Circuit relied on exactly this reasoning in the 1990 case of
Schafer v. Board of Public Education. 6' The court concluded that a school district
relied on a facially discriminatory policy by providing a year-long, unpaid leave
to women but not men. Despite the employer's insistence that it was offering a
twelve-month pregnancy "disability" leave, the Third Circuit refused to extend
Guerra to situations where there was not a "simultaneous showing of a
continuing disability related to either the pregnancy or to the delivery of the
child."' 68 Similarly, citing Schafer, the Seventh Circuit has observed that
"failure to allow fathers to avail themselves of a more generous child-raising
leave available to women employees might [violate Title VII] .,169
163. Id. at 290.
164. Id.
16S. Id. at 275 n.1 (using "reasonable" three times, quoting the California statute); id. at 287 &
n.24 (using "reasonable" two times, quoting a Connecticut statute); id. at 289
(characterizing the California policy as reasonable).
166. See, e.g., Nancy E. Dowd, Stigmatizing Single Parents, 18 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 19, 70 n.304
(1995); Shannon E. Liss, The Constitutionality of Pregnancy Discrimination: The Lingering
Effects of Geduldig and Suggestions for Forcing Its Reversal, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE
59, 8o & n.ioo (1997).
167. 903 F.2d 243 (3d Cir. 199o). Factual disputes prevented the court from granting summary
judgment. Id. at 248.
168. Id. at 248; see also Samuel Issacharoff & Elyse Rosenblum, Women and the Workplace:
Accommodating the Demands of Pregnancy, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2154, 2187 (1994) ("After
Schafer, it appears that Guerra does not control situations in which biological differences do
not dictate the need for accommodation.").
169. Maganuco v. Leyden Cmty. High Sch. Dist. 212, 939 F.2d 44o, 445 n.1 (7th Cir. 1991).
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While the Schafer decision represents the most plausible reading of Guerra,
it should be noted that the Sixth Circuit reached a different conclusion in
Harness v. Hartz Mountain Corp. 7' Although the case was brought under
Kentucky law, there were no state decisions interpreting the relevant provision,
and the language at issue was nearly identical to the PDA. Therefore, the
federal court announced its reliance on Guerra and upheld an employer policy
that provided a one-year unpaid leave to biological mothers. 1 ' The decision is
unlikely to be persuasive today for two reasons. First, Harness was decided in
1989, only a few years after Guerra and before any of the recent developments
discussed below. More importantly, the Harness plaintiff was not a father. He
was a heart attack victim who insisted that cardiac patients were discriminated
against as compared to pregnant women. Thus, since his claim was not that
fathers were discriminated against as compared to mothers, the case did not
force the court to address the relevant question. 72
Moreover, the passage of the FMLA, buttressed by the Supreme Court's
interpretation of that Act in Hibbs, counsels a dynamic reading of the PDA that
emphatically reaches the same conclusion as the Third Circuit's Schafer
holding. 73 Justice Marshall's classically purposivist opinion in Guerra focused
on the "remedial purpose of the PDA," emphasizing legislative sponsors'
statements that the PDA would "guarantee women the basic right to participate
fully and equally in the workforce."'' 74 Because Congress in 1978 was concerned
with "full and equal" participation, Justice Marshall in 1987 saw the PDA as "a
floor beneath which pregnancy disability benefits may not drop -not a ceiling
above which they may not rise."17 The FMLA critically redefined Congress's
belief about "full and equal" participation in the modern workforce. Congress
insisted that the FMLA "minimizes the potential for employment
discrimination on the basis of sex by ensuring generally that leave is
available. . . on a gender-neutral basis.' '176 In other words, gender neutrality,
specifically in the context of childrearing leave, was essential to promoting
equality in the workplace. Hibbs underscored this belief, noting that "Congress
170. 877 F.2d 1307 (6th Cir. 1989).
171. Id. at 1309-10 (explaining the reliance on Guerra).
172. Id. at 1307; see also Melissa B. Kessler, Recent Case, Schafer v. Board of Public Education,
903 F. 2d 243 (3 d Cir. 199o), 64 TEMP. L. REv. 1047 1054-57 (1991) (explaining how the
Schafer court distinguished Harness).
173. Cf WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMic STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 48-80 (1994)
(explaining the interpretative methodology underlying "dynamic interpretation").
174. Cal. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 285, 289 (1987).
175. Id. at 285.
176. 29 U.S.C. § 26o1(b)( 4 ) (2000).
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sought to ensure that family-care leave would no longer be stigmatized as an
inordinate drain on the workplace caused by female employees. 1' 77 This change
in attitude, in Congress and on the Court, suggests that those leave policies
intended for childrearing, but masquerading as disability benefits, are
impermissible.
Moreover, dicta in Hibbs provide clear support for this position.178 The
opinions discuss a 1990 Louisiana statute that provided a sixteen-week
disability leave' 79 - identical to some law firm policies discussed above. Chief
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion attacked the statute's extended disability
leave, calling it an "invalid stereotype" that provided leave "far [in excess] of
the medically recommended pregnancy disability leave period of six weeks."' 8
Furthermore, Justice Kennedy's dissent objected to the attack only by
emphasizing that the majority mischaracterized the facts: the Louisiana leave
was limited to the actual period of a woman's disability, up to a maximum of
sixteen weeks.181 The analogous law firm policies, of course, are not so limited,
and are impermissible under either view. Relatedly, Justice Kennedy, in a
passage that was favorably quoted in the majority opinion, goes even further
by specifically recognizing the Title VII implications of gender disparity in
these policies. A policy, he says, that provides women with twenty-four weeks
of leave and men with only twelve "might run afoul of... Title VII.''182 Chief
Justice Rehnquist reflects on this passage, going further still, and commending
Justice Kennedy for "recognizing that such gender-based discrimination would
[violate Title V1I.]"'18 In light of this language, in which both the majority and
the dissent insist that extended leaves for women alone are illegal, caregiving
leaves that merely call themselves disability policies should not be expected to
survive a Title VII challenge.'
8 4
177. Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 722-23 (2003).
178. Although scholars have expressed concern that the addition of Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Alito to the Court may threaten Hibbs's federalism holding, e.g., Daniel P. Tokaji,
The New Vote Denial: Where Election Reform Meets the Voting Rights Act, 57 S.C. L. REV. 689,
729 n.275 (2oo6), the argument made here is unrelated to the Court's federalism
jurisprudence.
179. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 733 n.6.
180. Id.
181. See id. at 751-52 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 756 (emphasis added).
183. Id. at 739 n.12 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
184. Reva Siegel has offered a similar view of Hibbs, highlighting the Court's disapproval of
"leave [that] was nominally for childbearing but was in fact (at least in part) a kind of leave
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This understanding of the Supreme Court's approach is reflected in an
Iowa district court's 2005 decision in Johnson v. University of Iowa. 85 The court
upheld an employer's leave policy that differentiated between men and women
but emphasized that the challenged portions of the policy concerned disability
leave. "If the University were to provide biological mothers caregiving leave
not based on disability, and did not provide equal leave to fathers," the court
observed, "that would violate Title VII.,,86 It is clear that Guerra cannot
appropriately be extended to cover anything beyond disability leave reflecting
actual physical disability. 187
Similarly, EEOC guidance on caregiver discrimination has incorporated
this narrow understanding of Guerra. An agency guidance document warns
employers:
Significantly, while employers are permitted by Title VII to provide
women with leave specifically for the period that they are incapacitated
because of pregnancy.., employers may not treat either sex more
favorably with respect to other kinds of leave, such as leave for
childcare purposes. To avoid a potential Title VII violation, employers
should carefully distinguish between pregnancy-related leave and
other forms of leave, ensuring that any leave specifically provided to
women alone is limited to the period that women are incapacitated by
pregnancy and childbirth. 1'88
There is no reason to think that, by calling an extended leave a "disability
leave," law firms' policies can survive Title VII scrutiny.
Approaching this analysis from another perspective, the International Union
opinion strongly cautions against any expansion of the Guerra exception.
Justice Blackmun's opinion in that case eviscerated the Seventh Circuit for
that men might also have used for parenting purposes." Siegel, supra note 157, at 1889; see
also Williams, supra note 86, at 382-83.
185. 408 F. Supp. 2d 728 (S.D. Iowa 2004), affid, 431 F. 3d 325 (8th Cir. 2005).
186. Id. at 742.
187. One might speculate that the purposivist nature of the Guerra decision might trouble the
current, textually oriented Supreme Court. In the context of "super-strong" statutory stare
decisis, however, the Court is unlikely to overrule Guerra in its entirety. See William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1363-64 (1988). Moreover,
skepticism of decisions like Guerra actually supports the claims advanced here, as
consideration of grossly uneven leave policies allows courts to limit and clarify the Guerra
holding.
i88. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, supra note 102, at 24-25. This section of the
guidance document explicitly relies on Guerra. See id. at 24 n.79.
1220
118: 1182 2009
CHILDBEARING, CHILDREARING, AND TITLE VII
treating an "obvious" case of facial discrimination as a disparate impact
claim.'89 The Court further chastised the employer for impermissible
paternalism, analogized between "fetal protection policies" and the long-
denounced protectionism of Muller v. Oregon,'9" and insisted that the Title VII
analysis "does not depend on why the employer discriminates but rather on the
explicit terms of the discrimination. 91 International Union's scathing
condemnation of facially discriminatory policies, whatever their purpose,
suggests that Guerra should be read as a narrow exception allowing limited
facial classifications, rather than a blank check to provide any and all benefits in
the name of pregnancy.' 92
Thus, while the Supreme Court has not squarely addressed the issues, it is
perhaps surprising that even in the face of favorable EEOC guidance, relevant
dicta in recent Supreme Court precedent, and a circuit court decision that has
been on record for more than fifteen years, law firms continue to provide leave
policies that arguably run afoul of Title VII. Before turning to this issue in
Section III.D, the next Section discusses another vulnerability in law firm
provision of parental leave: firms' reliance on gendered primary caregiver leave
policies.
C. As-Applied Challenges to Primary Caregiver Leave
Law firm policies that differentiate between primary and non-primary
caregivers may also be vulnerable to employee allegations of discrimination
under Title VII, and eleven firms in this sample rely on such distinctions. As
discussed in Part II, primary caregiver policies are pernicious for two reasons.
First, the policies often assume that women will be the primary caregiver.
Second, even if neutrally applied, by affirming that each household should
have a "primary" parent, these policies make it more difficult to change family
patterns. While the second concern is certainly not actionable under Title VII,
i89. Int'l Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 197-98 (1991).
190. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
191. Int'l Union, 499 U.S. at 199; see also id. at 200 ("The beneficence of an employer's purpose
does not undermine the conclusion that an explicit gender-based policy is sex discrimination
192. Case law within the circuit courts has provided an additional layer of support for this
argument. In a series of PDA cases considering the exclusion of infertility treatments from
insurance coverage, the courts have emphasized the distinction between fertility and
pregnancy, echoing the need to read Guerra narrowly. See Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316
F.3d 337, 346 (2d Cir. 2003); see also Griffin v. Sisters of Saint Francis, Inc., 489 F.3d 838, 843
(7th Cir. 2007); Lambert v. McCann Erickson, 543 F. Supp. 2d 265, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
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gender-biased application can present a colorable disparate treatment claim. A
complete discussion of the Court's analysis of disparate treatment cases is
beyond the scope of this Note, and the shape of the claim would necessarily
rely on facts particular to the challenging employee. The discussion that
follows first describes primary caregiver policies in more detail, and then
briefly analyzes how a claim might develop.
There is significant evidence that facially neutral primary caregiver policies
are unevenly applied. Men are pressured not to request primary caregiver leave,
are denied leave they request, and are stigmatized when they return from leave
they do receive.' 93 Martin Malin has aptly assailed this "your wife should do it"
attitude and described how it negatively impacts fathers and children. 194 One
need not reach the facts of a particular male attorney's experience to see how
these policies assume that in the majority of cases, women will be the primary
caregivers. In fact, law firms' own descriptions clearly reflect these biases.
Consider the descriptions, drawn from the NALP questionnaire, that
appear in Table 4. In each of these cases, the employer's leave policy would be
illogical without the assumption that in most cases the biological mother
would be the primary caregiver.
Table 4.
EXAMPLES OF IMPLICITLY GENDERED PRIMARY CAREGIVER LEAVE POLICIES.
For women: "12-16 weeks paid disability [and] 6 weeks Men only receive 6 weeks if they are
[paid leave.]" For men: "2 weeks [paid leave]; 6 weeks if the primary caregivers, but women
primar caregiver [.1"19s are automatically entitled to 6 weeks.
'[A] birth mother who is the primary caregiver will There is no provision for men who
ordinarily be entitled to 2 weeks before the birth and 14 are primary caregivers.
weeks after the birth. Male attorneys receive 4 or 6
weeks .... 96
Women receive "8 weeks if [they are the] primary There is no standard coverage for the
caregiver," and no special disability leave is available. '97 disability associated with childbirth.
Rather, the employer assumes it is
covered under the primary caregiver
leave.
193. See supra notes 113-12o and accompanying text.
194. See Malin, supra note 81; Malin, supra note 115, at 39. In both articles, Malin describes how
fathers' inability to assert family needs negatively impacts children. See Malin, supra note 81
at 1052-59; Malin, supra note 115, at 28-30.
195. Id. (workplace questionnaire for Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP).
196. Id. (workplace questionnaire for Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LIP).
197. Id. (workplace questionnaire for Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker LLP).
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It is clear that, in these instances, primary caregiver policies are not really
designed to accommodate families where a biological mother will not be the
primary caregiver. Indeed, these policies make the most sense if viewed as a
limited attempt to replicate traditional family roles in cases of adoption,
including adoption by gay couples, or, alternatively, as an effort to escape Title
VII liability of the type described in the preceding Section while still providing
generous benefits to women. ' 98
Firms' descriptions of their leave policies do more than illustrate
underlying biases; they may also be used as evidence by male attorneys who
feel they have been inappropriately denied primary caregiver leave. As a
consequence, even if the biased website descriptions are shorthand to describe
more meticulously neutral policies, they are still persuasive and, according to
the EEOC, admissible evidence of "stereotypical or derogatory comments"
made by human resources officials.' 99 Other observers have offered substantial
evidence that primary caregiver leave is actually applied in the way these
descriptions suggest.2° ° In addition, the fact that firms' human resources staffs
choose to describe the policies in this way suggests that they are unaccustomed
to granting men primary caregiver leave. One should not overstate the extent
to which these brief descriptions illustrate actual firm practice, and any Title
VII claim must move quickly from this language to the details of actual
discrimination and workplace consequences endured by male employees.
Nonetheless, the policy descriptions provide a window into employer practices,
and they are certainly a reasonable source of evidence regarding bias in primary
caregiver policies.
Indeed, the Hibbs decision and the Title VII cases discussed above indicate
that the assumptions inherent in these descriptions are impermissible
stereotypes. Hibbs denounced "stereotypes presuming a lack of domestic
responsibilities for men," and employers' decisions to deny men
"accommodations" for family caretaking °' Similarly, the Schafer court insisted
198. For example, after affirming that "family means different things to different people," and
offering two months of paid leave to a "birth mother or primary caregiver" one firm explains
that "fathers and non-primary caregivers [receive a] paid leave of up to two weeks." Orrick,
Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, Benefits and Compensation-Laterals, http://www.orrick.com/
careers/laterals/compensation.asp (last visited Feb. 6, 2009) (emphasis added). The
cumbersome phrasing and use of different conjunctions makes the most sense if you
imagine how the policy would be applied to gay men adopting a child.
199. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, supra note 102, at 9; see also Santiago-Ramos v.
Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 55 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding that comments
regarding work-life balance were evidence of discrimination).
2oo. See sources cited supra notes 8o-8i.
201. Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721,736 (2003).
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that "childrearing by a mother or childrearing by a father should be on the
basis of full parity."2 °2 The EEOC has further explained that it is impermissible
for employers to "den[y] male employees' requests for leave for childcare
purposes even while granting female employees' requests."20 3
The limited case law available supports this conclusion. In Knussman v.
Maryland,2 °4 an equal protection case, the Fourth Circuit concluded that an
employer applied a facially neutral leave policy in an impermissibly
discriminatory way. There, the plaintiff was denied a "primary care giver"
leave, despite the fact that such leaves were customarily granted to women."'
In a straightforward opinion, the court of appeals upheld a verdict in favor of
the plaintiff, saying only that the "jury could have reasonably concluded from
the evidence that [the personnel officer] should have recognized that she was
applying a gender neutral leave statute in a discriminatory manner by making
only men prove they are primary care givers to a newborn or adopted child. '',6
Therefore, with the right facts, a male employee denied primary caregiver
leave should be able to present a disparate treatment argument, and the EEOC
is likely to show interest in resolving the claim. Similarly, female attorneys at
these firms who find themselves discriminated against on the basis of
assumptions about or hostility towards their family responsibilities may also
find their claims supported by language about primary caregivers.
D. Explaining the Persistence of Vulnerable Policies
Nearly 20% of the country's "most prestigious" law firms offer parental
leave in ways that arguably violate Title VII, either by offering an extended
disability leave that effectively provides a childrearing benefit to women alone,
or by disguising gender bias in a primary caregiver leave policy. Two firms
offer sixteen-week fixed disability leave in violation of Title VII. Yet these firms
operate highly regarded employment law practices, and many of their male
attorneys are well-versed in the scope of federal liability for gender
discrimination. This Section attempts to explain why discriminatory policies
persist in this climate, discussing factors influencing firms and their male
employees.
202. Schafer v. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 903 F.2d 243, 250 (3d Cir. 199o).
203. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, supra note 102, at 24.
204. 272 F. 3d 625 (4 th Cir. 2001).
205. Id. at 628.
2o6. Id. at 632.
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To begin, there may be some legitimate uncertainty about the scope of
permissible "pregnancy disability leave." Because law firms provide temporary
disability insurance for other conditions, the PDA requires the provision of
pregnancy disability leave. Typical estimates of postpartum disability cluster
around six weeks,2 °7 so employers may simply be erring to the safe side by
providing eight or even ten week disability leave. This defense becomes far less
persuasive as leave reaches sixteen weeks; nonetheless, the lack of clarity at the
margins may lead to an expansive gray zone in which employers feel authorized
to offer progressively longer disability benefits.
It is perhaps possible that law firms may recognize the Title VII
implications of their behavior but nonetheless conclude that they maximize
their competitive position by retaining the policies. The fact that some law
firms have recently extended their maternity leave policies, without any
concomitant changes in paternity leave,2" 8 would be consistent with this
explanation. However, given the evidence that male attorneys often do not take
even the meager leave that is available to them,2° 9 it seems unnecessary for
firms to take that risk.
Alternatively, and more plausibly, law firms may simply be unaware of
their potential Title VII liability. The lack of litigation in this area may mean
that legal employers have not considered that their extended disability and
primary caregiver policies run afoul of federal law. Little data is available, but
there is some evidence suggesting that, in the past, law firms have offered
policies that were clearly impermissible. In particular, in 1999 one researcher
conducted a NALP survey of D.C. law firms, and found that 38% provided
nondisability maternity leave but not paternity leave. '° Three years later, the
Fourth Circuit decided Knussman v. Maryland,' which placed the
impermissibility of explicitly discriminatory leave policies like these in
headlines across the country. Indeed, before Knussman, and even before the
survey of firms, several scholars had persuasively argued that these policies
were plainly illegal, 12 but law firms were apparently unaware of this liability.
Though no post-Knussman comparative survey is available, the analysis in Part
207. See McGovern et al., supra note 35, at 1.
2o8. See sources cited supra note 29.
209. See supra notes 8o-81, 113-12o and accompanying text.
210. See Catherine Cloud Barre, Note, The Viability of Maternity Leave Policies Under Title VII and
the Equal Protection Clause, 5 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 603, 614 n.67 (1998).
211. 272 F.3d 625 (4 th Cir. 2001).
212. See Barre, supra note 210, at 620 (concluding that the policies were "impermissibly
discriminatory under Title VII"); Issacharoff& Rosenblum, supra note 168.
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I makes clear that, at least today, no prestigious D.C. firm offers such an
explicitly discriminatory policy. As a result, despite the assumption that law
firms might be more aware of such issues, it would appear that these firms, like
any other employer, may simply be insufficiently attentive to the contours of
Title VII liability to have adjusted their leave policies accordingly.
Similarly, although Title VII liability for existing policies is fairly clear from
the text of the relevant decisions, it is contained within a jurisprudence that has
focused almost entirely on protecting women. Ever since the Supreme Court's
decision in Gilbert23 was overturned by the PDA, the Court's Title VII cases
have extended substantive protections to women. To the extent that the Court
has ruled against female plaintiffs, it has been through procedural, not
substantive, decisions. 14 The EEOC guidance, which unambiguously spells
out the need to limit gender-specific leave to the "period that [women] are
incapacitated," is nonetheless largely focused on employers' responsibilities to
female employees."' The Court's decision in Guerra authorizes favorable
treatment of pregnant employees.1 6 While the discussion in Section III.B
illustrates the clearly articulated limits on the Guerra holding, the central
emphasis of the case is clear. As a result, employers may simply focus on
potential liability for failing to accommodate the needs of pregnant women,
while ignoring the gender equity implications of these decisions.
The absence of suits challenging these types of policies, and the rarity of
Title VII litigation initiated by men in the workforce as a whole, lends support
to this suggestion. A recent study on "family responsibilities" litigation
uncovered over six-hundred lawsuits alleging discrimination under Title VII,
the FMLA, and related statutes . 17 Of these cases, only forty-three were
brought by men, and the vast majority of men's suits dealt with job-guaranteed
unpaid leave under the FMLA" 8 The handful of cases that have touched upon
relevant themes under Title VII, discussed above, all considered men's
213. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
214. See, e.g., Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 55o U.S. 618 (2007), superseded by
statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §
2oooe-5(e)); Desert Palace Inc. v. Costa, S39 U.S. 90, (2003); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
490 U.S. 228 (1989).
215. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, supra note 102, at 24.
216. Cal. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
217. MARY C. STILL, LITIGATING THE MATERNAL WALL 8 (2006), http://www.uchastings.edu/
sitefiles/WLL/FRDreport.pdf.
218. Id.; see, e.g., Blohm v. Dillard's Inc., 95 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D.N.C. 2000) (suing under the
FMLA).
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exclusion from relatively lengthy leave of six months to a year,219 and thus do
little to explicitly suggest the consequences of extended disability leave.
Furthermore, the investigation revealed thirty-three suits against legal
employers, none of which involved male employees."2
Understanding why men have failed to initiate relevant lawsuits is more
complicated. To begin, employers' more extreme hostility toward men
asserting caregiving responsibility may be a substantial deterrent.2 ' While
individuals in professional occupations constitute a sizable percentage of
relevant suits, 2 male professionals bear the brunt of "providership"
assumptions about fatherhood and may be simply uninterested in legal redress.
Furthermore, they may be deterred by the jurisprudential rhetoric of protecting
women, which enables firms to offer these policies in the first place. Although
activists have taken steps toward welcoming men,223 much of their platform is
still focused on women and organized around the concept of the "maternal
wall," and men may not feel that the litigation teams will welcome their claims.
This is particularly true for challenges to extended disability leave. Indeed, the
Center for WorkLife Law counsels men that they may find themselves
impermissibly discouraged "from taking paternity [benefits] to which they are
entitled," but does not invite them to compare their entitlements to those of
their female colleagues.2 4 But perhaps the most important deterrent is the
limitation on remedies for Title VII claims. Since 1991, Title VII has allowed
victims to claim compensatory and punitive damages. 2 Punitive damages,
however, are only available where there is evidence of intentional and malicious
discrimination,26 extremely unlikely in these cases, and the statute places a cap
219. See supra Section III.A.
220. See Williams et al., supra note 113, at 410 (stating that there were "no reported cases
involving discrimination claims against law firms by men").
221. See Joan C. Williams & Stephanie Bornstein, Caregivers in the Courtroom: The Growing Trend
of Family Responsibilities Discrimination, 41 U.S.F. L. REv. 171, 181 (2006) ("If there is a chilly
climate for mothers in the workplace, there is a frigid climate for fathers.").
222. STILL, supra note 218, at 8.
223. See Center for WorkLife Law, Men and FRD, http://www.worklifelaw.org/MenFRD.html
(last visited Feb. 6, 2009).
224. Id.
225. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(s) (2000); see Michael W. Roskiewicz, Title VWI Remedies: Lifting the
Statutory Caps from the Civil Rights Act of 1991 To Achieve Equal Remedies for Employment
Discrimination, 43 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 391, 401-07 (1993) (describing the 1991
changes to Tide VII).
226. 42U.S.C. § i9 8ia(b)(1).
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of $300,000 (excluding backpay) on compensatory awards.227 Thus, new
fathers may be simply uninterested in the costs-in time, resources, and
professional reputation-of initiating these claims.
CONCLUSION
By providing extended maternity benefits to women without offering men
any substantial period of paid time off, law firm leave policies can place hurdles
in front of male and female lawyers. An empirical analysis of one hundred law
firms reveals that firms generally offer women much more generous parental
leave policies than they make available to men, and some firms design their
leave policies in particularly troubling ways. Those firms that provide grossly
disproportionate maternity and paternity leave periods entrench norms about
the correct way to allocate family responsibility, stereotype attorneys of both
genders, and stymie reformers seeking to restructure the American workplace.
These policies, while not currently the subject of litigation, appear significantly
vulnerable under modern Title VII jurisprudence. Policies that offer women
extremely lengthy disability leave, and primary caregiver policies framed in
less-than-equal terms, conflate the distinction between childbearing and
childrearing and constitute impermissible discrimination on the basis of sex.
While they offer important insights into the manifestation of gender and
family responsibilities discrimination in the workplace, improving leave
policies can be, at most, only a small component of a greater reform agenda.
Other scholars have emphasized the importance of gender equality in law
firms' modified-work-schedule programs, stressing that men need full access
to part time, flex time, and compressed schedules in order to more fully
transform their roles in both the family and the workplace." 8 It is also
important to address barriers that prevent men from taking advantage of the
benefits available to them -it will not be enough to change policies if men
continue to be afraid of "tak[ing] abuse" for utilizing those family-oriented
benefits to which they are entitled.29
Still, leave policies themselves can be an important early step toward
change. What, then, is the appropriate design for parental leave at large law
227. Id. § 1981a(b)(3) (capping damages on a sliding scale based on employer size).
a28. See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 3, at 978-90; see also Joan Williams & Cynthia Thomas
Calvert, Balanced Hours: Effective Part-Time Policies for Washington Law Firms, 8 WM. &
MARY J. WOMEN& L. 357 (2002).
229. ENGLISH, supra note 18, at 21o; see also id. at 209-10 (describing the experiences of men who
took time off); Cunningham, supra note 3, at 991-95 (discussing fathers' "reluctance to work
part-time"). See generally supra notes 8o-8i, 113-12o and accompanying text.
1228
118:11.82 2009
CHILDBEARING, CHILDREARING, AND TITLE VII
firms? And are these appropriate designs at all prevalent? Of the firms
surveyed, 20% offer leave policies that arguably violate Title VII. Certainly
those policies are far from ideal. Another 34% provide leave in ways that do not
appear subject to the same amount of legal jeopardy, but nonetheless suffer
from many of the same problems. These policies, for example, offer marginally
longer parental leave to men in combination with extremely extended disability
leave, or they offer a somewhat shorter fixed disability leave but make no
benefits available to fathers. The remaining 46% of firms offer leave policies
that, by convincingly disaggregating the concepts of childbearing and
childrearing, are less inherently objectionable. These policies either provide
identical benefits to mothers and fathers, or they combine normal disability
benefits with generous parental leave. Identical parental leave is certainly one
approach to ensuring that men as well as women can spend time parenting
newborns, but firms may also legitimately wish to compensate women for the
period of pregnancy related disability. Firms looking to advance an optimal
policy might consider offering both a disability leave that is congruent with
actual pregnancy disability (approximately six weeks) and a meaningful
parental leave that gives all parents the opportunity for childrearing.23° Indeed,
an ideal policy might provide six weeks of fixed disability leave and six weeks
of gender-neutral parental leave - offering women the twelve-week leave that is
so common at firms today but offering men a more generous and proportional
benefit.
Framing parental leave in this way emphasizes the need to make
childrearing an important part of both male and female lawyers' lives. The
argument develops not by disguising the fact that women have family
responsibilities, but by insisting that those responsibilities be more widely
shared, thereby offering a palatable platform for reform.23" ' By demanding that
employers distinguish childbearing from childrearing, activists can honorably
recognize the physical, differences associated with pregnancy while
simultaneously insisting that biology is not destiny in the twenty-first century
workplace. 3' Moreover, they can effectuate change in a way that benefits all
employees, lessening the conflict between work and family, supporting the
230. See generally WILLIAMs, UNBENDING, supra note 7, at 225-26 (suggesting that the "best design
for [parental leave] policies would offer, from the beginning of a child's life, leaves both for
the recovery from childbirth (available to postpartum women) and for caregiving (available
to all parents)").
231. Cf Salomone, supra note 124 (explaining modern feminism's tension around "essentialism"
and the "sameness/difference" debate).
232. Cf SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX 42 (H.M. Parshley ed. & trans., Alfred A. Knopf,
Inc. 1971) (1953); BETTY FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE 19 (1963).
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parents of young children, and enabling all individuals to succeed in their
careers.
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